Customer-base concentration, profitability and distress across the corporate life cycle by Irvine, Paul et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Customer-base concentration,
profitability and distress across the
corporate life cycle
Paul Irvine and Shawn Saeyeul Park and Celim Yildizhan
Neeley School of Business, Texas Christian University, Terry College
of Business, University of Georgia, Terry College of Business,
University of Georgia
10. October 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58435/
MPRA Paper No. 58435, posted 9. September 2014 15:22 UTC
Customer-base concentration, protability and distress across the
corporate life cycle
Paul J. Irvine
Neeley School of Business
Texas Christian University
Shawn Saeyeul Park
Terry College of Business
University of Georgia
Çelim Y¬ld¬zhan
Terry College of Business
University of Georgia
August, 2014
Corresponding author Paul Irvine, Neeley School of Business email: p.irvine@tcu.edu. The authors wish to thank
seminar participants at the University of Georgia, Georgia State University, TCU, the FMA doctoral consortium,
AAA annual meeting, Linda Bamber, Lauren Cohen, Lee Cohen, Emmanuel De George, David Folsom, Stu Gillan,
Sara Holland, Steven Lim, DJ Nanda, and Lin Zou. We also thank Lauren Cohen, Elizabeth Demers and Philip Joos
for generously sharing their data.
Customer-base concentration, pro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Abstract
Using a recently expanded data set on supplier-customer links, we examine how customer concentration
a¤ects rm protability. We nd that the relation between customer concentration and rm protability is
more complex than recent literature suggests. We conrm that customer concentration promotes operating
e¢ ciencies for protable rms. However, we nd a di¤erent result for younger, less protable rms where
customer concentration impairs rm protability and can increase distress risk. We explain these di¤erences
by introducing a relationship life-cycle hypothesis wherein the relation between customer-base concentration
and protability is time-varying; being signicantly negative in the early years of the relationship, and turning
positive as the relationship matures. The key driver of this dynamic is the customer-specic investments
the relationship entails. These investments result in larger xed costs and greater operating leverage early
in the relationship, but can signicantly benet the rm as the relationship matures.
JEL Classications: L25; M41; G31; G33
Keywords: Customer concentration, customer-specic investments, life-cycle, selling, general and admin-
istrative expense, protability, default risk.
1 Introduction
Winning the business of a major customer is an exciting event in the life of the rm. Business from
major customers can increase rm revenues markedly and permit e¢ ciencies of scale in operations
and delivery. Despite these advantages, economists have long warned of the danger of supplying
a considerable fraction of rm output to a particular customer. Lustgarten (1975) credits Gal-
braith (1952) with the origin of the concept that large customers are threats to manufacturers
operating prots. The problem with major customers is that margin improvements that the rm
can receive, through selling e¢ ciencies or other economies of scale, do not necessarily accrue to
the rm. Major customers recognize their strong bargaining position and can engage in ex-post
renegotiation over the contract terms (Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1979)).
Once the rm has committed resources to production for a major customer, these customer-specic
investments represent costs that the rm cannot fully recover unless they can complete the order
for the customer. Major customers can impair rm protability by demanding price concessions,
extended trade credit or other benets. For example, Balakrishnan, Linsmeier and Venkatachalan
(1996) argue that major customers are aware of the rms cost savings from JIT adoption, and that
subsequent customer demands for concessions prevent the adopters from improving protability.1
In his empirical study of customer concentration, Lustgarten (1975) concludes that high customer
concentration (at the industry level) reduces rm protability.
Patatoukas (2012) challenges the conventional wisdom that customer concentration impairs
rm protability. Using SFAS 14 and SEC Reg S-K mandated disaggregated revenue disclosures
available from Compustat, he creates a rm-specic measure of customer concentration and nds
a positive relation between customer concentration and accounting rates of return. Patatoukas
(2012) points out that a narrow focus on customer concentration and gross margins can obscure
the e¤ects of customer concentration on key valuation metrics such as accounting rates of return.
Highlighting the ability of the DuPont protability analysis to make this point, Patatoukas (2012)
1Recently, Ng (2013) relates the example of Procter and Gamble who plan to extend the time they take to pay
suppliers from 45 days to 75 days.
2
naturally follows earlier studies on rm protability (Faireld and Yohn (2001), Soliman (2008)),
and focuses on rms with positive operating performance. While this sample selection criterion is
often unavoidable in valuation research, such as the case where negative current earnings cannot
be capitalized, the criterion can be avoided in a study of supplier-customer relations.
Taking advantage of a recent expansion in this data set, we extend the Patatoukas (2012)
analysis to include rms with negative operating performance and re-examine the relation between
customer concentration and rm protability over the 1977-2007 period. We nd that the rela-
tion between customer concentration and protability is more complex than a simple positive or
negative relation. While we nd that many of Patatoukas (2012) conclusions about protable
rms hold using the expanded data set, we also show that they are not generalizable to rms with
negative operating performance. Such rms tend to be younger, their sales more dependent on
major customers, they encounter greater demand uncertainty, and they face a higher probability
of nancial distress. The adverse impact of customer concentration on unprotable rms produces
a negative relation between customer concentration and rm protability in the full sample.
These results challenge us to synthesize our ndings with Patatoukas (2012). To do so, we
develop a life-cycle hypothesis about the e¤ects of customer concentration on rm protability.
We show that the relationship between customer concentration and rmsoperating risk and prof-
itability largely reects the di¤ering costs and benets that occur throughout the relationship life
cycle. Motivated by Williamson (1979) and Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003) we empha-
size the importance of customer-specic selling, general and administrative (SG&A) investments in
explaining these life-cycle e¤ects. We nd that early in the relationship rms with higher customer
concentration make more customer-specic SG&A expenses believing that such investments will
lead to the operating e¢ ciencies documented in Patatoukas (2012). However, customer-specic
SG&A expenses are, by denition, less transferable than general SG&A investments and thus in-
crease the xity of SG&A costs, leading to higher operating leverage. To document this relation, we
show that the elasticity of SG&A costs with respect to sales is lower in rms with higher customer
concentration. These negative e¤ects are ameliorated as the relationship matures, eventually rms
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with high levels of customer concentration are rewarded with higher operating prots, consistent
with Patatoukas(2012) results.
Our results also suggest that customer concentration is one potential explanation for the Banker,
Byzalov and Plehn-Dujowichs (2014) counterintuitive nding that cost elasticity is inversely related
to demand uncertainty. After establishing that customer concentration is negatively related to
cost elasticity we then show that higher customer concentration is positively related to demand
uncertainty. This is logical as rms with major customers have relatively undiversied sources of
revenue, and their customer-specic investments prevent them from easily nding alternative sales
when faced with declining demand from their major customers. Consistent with this argument,
we nd that demand uncertainty monotonically increases from the lowest customer concentration
quintile to the highest customer concentration quintile.
For rms with concentrated customer bases, a higher level of demand uncertainty exacerbates
the increase in operating leverage. These operating risks have signicant e¤ects on capital structure
and rm failure. We nd that customer concentration is positively related to the probability of
rm failure in our sample. Extending the sample to rms that have no major customers, we nd
that rms with the lowest customer concentration values have lower probabilities of failure than
rms that have no major customers. This result is explained by the fact that the lowest customer
concentration rms have less debt compared to rms that have no major customers, even though
these two distinct groups of rms have similar levels of protability, cash holdings and idiosyncratic
volatility. More generally, customer concentration profoundly a¤ects capital structure: The higher
the customer concentration index, the lower the amount of debt in the rms capital structure.
This result is consistent with the proposition that rms with concentrated customer bases constrain
leverage to protect themselves from the devastating e¤ect of losing a major customer (Banerjee,
Dasgupta, and Kim (2008)). We nd that credit ratings deteriorate as customer concentration
increases, thus adding a cost dimension to the Banerjee et al. (2008) hypothesis.
Facing increases in operating leverage and demand uncertainty, a concentrated customer base is
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a risky choice for rms. However, as shown by Patatoukas (2012) customer concentration can lead
to operating e¢ ciencies and the possibility of achieving higher prots in the future. By examining
a subsample where the age of the supplier-customer link can be identied, we nd a number of
results that are consistent with our life-cycle hypothesis which we use to explain the dichotomy
between protable and unprotable rms. We document an important benet from having a major
customer by showing that the initial year of the relationship leads to signicant growth in rm sales.
We also nd that as the relationship matures, the initial adverse e¤ects of customer concentration
reverse, leading to improvements in rm operating margins and protability. These results are
consistent with our contention that the initial relationship-specic-costs major customers entail
can eventually pay o¤ in signicant benets for the rm. The equity market appears to recognize
the net benets from these relationships as positive abnormal returns are associated with changes
in customer concentration.
A major contribution of this paper is that it identies the existence and magnitudes of both
the costs and benets of customer concentration and how they vary over the relationship life cycle.
Knowledge of both the costs and benets of customer concentration is important to managers
making the crucial decision of whether to make customer-specic investments in the relationship
between the rm and a major customer. Our ability to document the costs and benets involved
in this decision supports the usefulness of mandated disaggregated revenue disclosures and, as in
Patatoukas (2012), highlights some of the benets of improving disaggregated information about
rmsoperations.
2 Hypothesis Development
In contrast to the traditional view that major customers can extract benets from their suppliers
and thus lower rm protability, there are several reasons why major customers could be benecial
to the rm. All orders are di¤erent, in either their design, manufacture or logistical delivery.
Meeting the demands of many small customers is expensive and rms can achieve economies of
scale from dealing with a few major customers. Volume discounts to large customers are common
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and reect these economies. Although a number of small orders can produce the same total sales
as a single large order, the rm faces the problem of customer retention and acquisition. As
customer retention and acquisition can be expensive, by dealing with a few major customers, rms
can potentially reduce these costs. Cohen and Schmidt (2009) document some of the benets
of attracting large clients and Carlton (1978) outlines how a lower customer-per-rm ratio helps
the rm coordinate pricing and production decisions. Jap and Ganesan (2000), Fee, Hadlock and
Thomas (2006) and Costello (2013) show how covenant restrictions and customer equity stakes can
alleviate contracting problems arising in the relationship.
Investigating the empirical evidence on customer concentration and rm protability, Pata-
toukas (2012) cites two studies (Newmark (1989) and Kalwani and Narayandas (1995)) that chal-
lenge Lustgartens (1975) nding that customer concentration reduces protability. Faced with this
mixed evidence, Patatoukas (2012) argues that whether major customers are benecial or detri-
mental to the rm is ultimately an empirical issue. He answers that question in the a¢ rmative by
showing that customer concentration leads to improved protability. Firms achieve this protability
through e¢ ciencies in SG&A expenses, inventory turnover and cash conversion improvements.
However, Patatoukas (2012) only examines rms with positive prots. To understand how
customer concentration is related to rm protability across the full range of protability, we
develop several hypotheses focusing on why the relation between customer concentration and rm
protability varies across the relationship life cycle. First, we hypothesize that the nature of
the rms customer base a¤ects the xity of SG&A expenses (Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman
(2003)). Higher customer concentration leads rms to make customer-specic SG&A investments to
capture operating e¢ ciencies that come with major-customer relationships. Such customer-specic
investments, by denition, are less transferable to other uses than more general investments. Firms
with high customer concentration thus tend to have a larger xed cost component in their SG&A
expenses. If this contention is true, then the elasticity of SG&A expenses with respect to sales
should be lower the more concentrated the rms customer base.
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Second, we hypothesize that a rm with high customer concentration faces higher demand un-
certainty. This occurs because rms with only a few major customers have relatively undiversied
sources of revenue, and their customer-specic investments prevent them from easily nding al-
ternative sales when faced with declining demand from their major customers. Firms with higher
customer concentration are more exposed to idiosyncratic demand shocks generated by their major
customers because when major customers receive their own demand shocks, they transfer these
demand shocks to their suppliers.
Third, we hypothesize that higher customer concentration increases rmsoperating risk. This
hypothesis is a natural extension of our initial two hypotheses, as higher xed costs lead to increases
in operating leverage which, coupled with higher demand uncertainty, increases operating risk. We
expect the amplication of operating risk that comes with higher customer concentration to manifest
itself through the credit risk channel leading to higher failure probability and higher cost of debt.
Fourth, we hypothesize that the relation between customer concentration and rmsoperating
risk and performance largely reect the di¤erent cost and benets that occur throughout the re-
lationship life-cycle. Since accounting research has not previously addressed how the life-cycle of
major customer relationships can a¤ect rmsoperating risk and performance, to construct our hy-
potheses we draw on the literature in marketing and management. The literature we cite routinely
studies the impact of major suppliers on dependent retailers rather than that of major customers
on dependent suppliers. However, from the theoretical and survey evidence provided we can infer
general principles that guide our exploration of how the life-cycle of the relationship a¤ects rm
protability.2
Wilson (1995) discusses how the major customer relationship presents the rm with both costs
and benets. The key features of his model incorporate relationship-specic investments that
provide both potential value but also increase operating risk. Wilson (1995) focuses on the life-
cycle of the relationship and posits that the success of the relationship can vary dynamically. This
2The limited accounting research that addresses life-cycle issues (Anthony and Ramesh (1992); Dickinson (2011))
examines the life cycle of the rm rather than the life-cycle of the major customer relationship.
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suggestion is key as it is necessary for our hypothesis to establish that there must be di¤erent
stages, with di¤erent costs and benets, in the life cycle of the relationship. However, in Wilsons
(1995) theory, the value of the relationship to the parties involved depends on hard-to-measure
concepts such as trust, cooperation and commitment.3 Jap and Ganesan (2000) also introduce a
dynamic framework when they outline how the optimal contract to deal with relationship-specic
investments can change over the relationship life-cycle. Finally, both Jap and Anderson (2007) and
Eggert, Ulaga and Schultz (2006) use survey data to formalize the supplier-customer relationship
into exploration, build up, maturity and decline stages and provide evidence on how the concepts
outlined by Wilson (1995) can change over the life-cycle. Jap and Anderson (2007) nd that the
decline phase of the relationship can last for a considerable period and suggest that this reects
the fact that relationship-specic investments can have surprisingly long lives. Eggert et al. (2006)
conclude that the value created from major customer relationships can increase over time but this
potential requires great commitment by both parties during the exploration and build-up phases.
From this literature we infer two broad principles of major customer relationships that guide
our empirical investigation. First, the relationship is dynamic and that optimal protability for the
rm may not occur until the relationship reaches its maturity phase. The second principle is that
the often explosive growth of the relationship during the exploration and build-up phases requires
relatively high relationship-specic investments early in the life-cycle. While Jap and Anderson
(2007) nd that these idiosyncratic investments can often provide surprisingly long-lived benets,
the Eggert et al. (2006) nding that optimal protability often occurs later in the relationship
suggests that these relationship-specic investments can increase costs during the early stages of
the relationship life-cycle.
These principles suggest that we can expect customer concentration to have a negative impact
on rm protability early in the relationship where protability is impaired by the build up of
customer-specic investments. However, if the relationship succeeds, then suppliers can expect
3Schloetzer (2012) provides a ne example of an attempt to outline the e¤ects of di¢ cult to quantify measures
such as information sharing and interdependence.
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operating protability to increase as the relationship matures. We can test these predictions for
a subsample where customers can be identied and thus, the age of the link between the supplier
and customer rms can be determined (LINKAGE). Where the necessary data to construct
LINKAGE is not available, we use the age of the supplier rm as an instrument for the age of the
relationship. Empirically, rm age is highly correlated with the age of major customer relationships,
yet still is an inferior instrument relative to LINKAGE. We also investigate whether rm age
reects the same life-cycle information as LINKAGE.4
3 Data
FASB accounting standards require all public companies to disclose the identities of their major
customers representing more than 10% of their total sales. We extract the identities of each rms
major customers from the Compustat Customer Segment Files. We focus on the period between
1977 and 2007. Compustat Customer Segment Files provide for each rm the names of its ma-
jor customers, revenue derived from sales to each major customer, and the type of each major
customer.5
For each rm we determine whether its customers are listed in the CRSP-Compustat database.
If they are, then we assign them to the corresponding rms PERMNO. Since the focus in this
paper is on customer concentration and its impact on rmsoperating and nancial performance,
even when the customer rm cannot be assigned a PERMNO, we still keep the supplier-customer
link in the sample and identify the customer rm as a non CRSP-Compustat company.6
Following Patatoukas (2012), we construct our primary measure of customer concentration using
4We recognize the validity of the Eggert et al. (2006) critique that link age itself is an imperfect measure of
life-cycle stage as some relationships may be designed to be shorter than others. However, the literature does not
supply an alternative instrument.
5The dataset groups customers into three broad categories based on their type: company(COMPANY), do-
mestic government(GOVDOM), and foreign government(GOVFRN). We exclude information on customers that
are identied as domestic or foreign governments, even if they may be major customers for a certain supplier rm.
6Cohen and Frazzini (2008) report that the Compustat Customer Segment les report the names of customer
companies but often fail to provide company identication codes such as customer rmsPERMNOs. For these
rms, we use a phonetic string matching algorithm to generate a list of potential matches to the customer name. We
then hand-match the customer to the corresponding PERMNO based on the rms name, segment, and SIC code.
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the following formula:
CCi;t =
nX
j=1

Sales to Customeri;j;t
Total Salesi;t
2
(1)
If rm i has n major customers in year t, the measure of customer concentration (CCi;t) of the
rm is dened as the sum of the squares of the sales shares to each major customer. The sales share
to each customer j in year t is calculated as the ratio of rm is sales to customer j in year t scaled
by rm is total sales in year t. Patatoukas (2012) constructs his customer concentration measure in
the spirit of the Herndahl-Hirschman index, and suggests that the measure captures two elements
of customer concentration: the number of major customers and the relative importance of each
major customer. By denition, the customer concentration (CC) is bounded between 0 and 1 as
CC is equal to 1 if the rm earns all of its revenue from a single customer and as the customer
base diversies CC tends to 0.
As in Patatoukas (2012), we exclude nancial services rms from the sample. Our sample
consists of all rms listed in the CRSP-Compustat database with non-negative book values of
equity, non-missing values of customer concentration (CC), market value of equity (MV ), annual
percentage sales growth (GROWTH), and accounting rates of return at the scal year-end when
we can identify major customers.7 After imposing these restrictions, we are left with 49,760 supplier
rm-year observations between 1977 and 2007.
Sample composition
Our sample di¤ers from the sample used in Patatoukas (2012). Patatoukas (2012) focuses on the
subsample of rm-year observations with positive operating margins, whereas we include rm-year
observations with operating losses. Of the 49,760 rm-year observations in our sample, 22,480 rm-
year observations have the corresponding CRSP-Compustat customer data necessary to construct
LINKAGE (45.2 percent), while 10,836 rm-year observations have operating losses (21.8 percent).
7 Including rms with both negative earnings and negative book values confounds a direct interpretation of higher
ROE as a good outcome. We drop negative book value rms to avoid this confusion. In unreported analysis, we
include negative book value rms and nd consistent results.
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Using the LINKAGE customer data subset, we can test our relationship life-cycle hypotheses. The
latter subset on operating losses allows us to determine if the impact of customer concentration on
rm protability is di¤erent for unprotable rms. Furthermore, over a comparable period we have
signicantly more rm-year observations with positive operating margins (38,924) than Patatoukas
(2012) 25,389.89
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 presents the time series of average customer concentration from 1977 to 2007 as reported
in the Compustat customer segment les. During this period each supplier averages 1.89 major
customers who generate 33 percent of its annual sales. However, each supplier rm accounts for
only 2% of their customerscost of goods sold. Over the sample period, customer concentration
exhibits a marked increase from the early years of the sample through 1997, a period coincident
with a general increase in the number of listed rms. The number of rms reporting customer
concentration then falls from a high of close to 3,500 in 1997 to what appears to be a steady state
of just over 2,000 for the 2002-2007 period. Consistent with Patatoukas (2012), median customer
concentration reveals a generally increasing trend over time, from a low of 0.03 in 1977 and 1978
to a high of over 0.06 in 2007.
Table 1 lists our variable denitions, grouped into two categories: (i) Supplier-rm character-
istics, and (ii) Default prediction variables used in our extension of the Campbell, Hilscher and
Szilagyi (2008) default prediction model. CC is the basic measure of customer concentration de-
scribed in Equation (1) and CC measures the year over year change in CC:
Table 2 presents summary statistics for several key variables for the full sample (Panel A), the
subset of rms with identiable customers (Panel B), and for positive and negative protability
groups (Panel C). The variables MV; AGE; and GROWTH dene the basic characteristics of
8Hoechle, Schmid, Walter and Yermack (2012) report a temporary deletion of valid Compustat segment le
observations during 2007-2008. This problem, as well as periodic updates to the Compustat segment les, can
account for the di¤erence in sample sizes between our paper and Patatoukas (2012).
9To alleviate concerns regarding our sample, we repeat all analyses using only the subset of rm-year observations
with positive operating margins and nd results qualitatively similar to Patatoukas (2012).
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supplier rms. MV measures the rms market value of equity in millions of dollars. AGE is the
rms age in years, measured from the time of its initial public o¤ering. GROWTH is the supplier
rms annual sales growth rate. ROA; ROE; and SGA; dene key operating characteristics of
supplier rms. ROA is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the beginning of year
book value of total assets for the rm. ROE is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to
the beginning of year book value of equity for the rm. SGA is the ratio of selling, general, and
administrative expenses to sales. IHLD is the ratio of inventory to the book value of total assets
for the rm. TLMTA and CASHMTA are dened as in Campbell et al. (2008) as total liabilities
and total cash scaled by the market value of total assets.
Panel A of Table 2 reports the mean, standard deviation, skewness, median, 25th, and 75th
percentile values for the key variables in this study. CC averages 10.1% for the 49,760 observations
in the sample with a standard of deviation of 14.7%. The latter statistic suggests that there is large
cross-sectional variation in rmsdependence on their major customers for revenues. Our sample
is considerably larger than the restricted sample in Patatoukas (2012), but mean CC is close to
the mean in Patatoukas (2012). This fact shows that any di¤ering results due to our expansion of
the sample is not attributable to radical di¤erences in customer concentration. Our sample rms
are younger and smaller than those in Patatoukas (2012). Firms in our sample average only 10.3
years of age compared to 14.8 in Patatoukas (2012) with a market cap of $806 million relative to
Patatoukas (2012) $1,206 million. Because we do not censor on protability, the average ROA
and ROE are lower at -0.01 (Patatoukas (2012), 0.06) and -0.03 (0.13), respectively. Three of our
main dependent variables, ROA; ROE and SGA, and the key explanatory variable, CC, are all
signicantly skewed. In order to mitigate the e¤ect of skewness, we use the decile rank of CC
(CC) instead of CC (CC), as in Patatoukas (2012), in our regression analyses.
Panel B of Table 2 examines statistics for the subsample of rms whose customers can be
identied and thus, LINKAGE can be determined. The average and standard deviation of CC
are comparable to the full sample at 11.6% and 14.8%. Indeed, the summary statistics of all the
key variables are comparable to the full sample. The LINKAGE subset rms are moderately
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larger with a mean market value of $997.0 million (compared to $806 in the full sample), and have
a slightly lower sales growth rate of 20% (22%).10
Panel C of Table 2 separates the sample into positive and negative operating margin groups.
For each group, we report the mean, median, and standard deviation of key variables and report
the di¤erences in means across the two groups. Positive operating margin rms dominate the
composition of the sample by a ratio of almost 4:1. The di¤erences between these two groups are
striking and almost always statistically and economically signicant. Negative operating margin
(OM) rms have a mean customer concentration of 14.2%, compared to 9.0% for positive OM rms
(t-statistic of the di¤erence = -27.6). They are also younger, averaging only 7.3 years compared to
11.1 years for the positive OM subsample (t-statistic of the di¤erence = 48.6). Total liabilities to
market assets averages 0.30 for the negative OM rms and 0.36 for positive OM rms. Negative
OM rms have more cash to total assets (CASHMTA) at 0.17 relative to the 0.09 cash holdings
of positive OM rms. We note by inspection that positive OM rms have more debt and less
cash, but both types of rms have signicant debt in their capital structure. Firms that are not
protable are, on average, younger, smaller in size, and more reliant on their major customers for
their revenues. Furthermore, rms with negative operating margins have signicantly higher SG&A
expenses as a percentage of their sales than protable rms.
In the rest of the paper we try to understand the di¤erences between rms with positive op-
erating margins and rms with negative operating margins and determine whether our life-cycle
hypothesis is a key driver of these di¤erences.
10Patatoukas (2012, p. 373) also provides evidence that this subset is consistent with the full sample.
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4 Results
4.1 Customer concentration and rm performance
4.1.1 Correlation Analysis
Table 3 presents Pearson and Spearman correlations across the full sample (Panel A), the positive
operating margin subsample (Panel B) and the negative operating margin subsample (Panel C).
By analyzing these correlations, we can get an initial idea of how the relation between customer
concentration and rm protability depends on the sign of operating protability. In the full
sample, customer concentration is negatively related to ROA and ROE with correlation coe¢ cients
of -0.11 and -0.08, respectively. In the positive OM subsample, the correlations are positive for
ROA at 0.03 and ROE at 0.01. In the negative OM subsample, the signs of these correlations
reverse. Here, the correlation between customer concentration and ROA is -0.07 and -0.02 for
ROE.11 The correlation between customer concentration and SGA, a key measure of operating
e¢ ciency in Patatoukas (2012), is positive in the full sample, indicating that customer concentration
is not generally associated with cost savings. Nevertheless, in the positive OM subsample, the
correlations are negative (-0.04), consistent with the ndings in Patatoukas (2012). In the negative
OM subsample, the sign of the correlation is reversed and relatively large at 0.23. Customer
concentration is negatively correlated with rm age in all three panels, suggesting that younger
rms tend to have higher customer concentration.
Our tests conrm Patatoukas (2012) nding that customer concentration can be positively
related to protability and that operating e¢ ciencies associated with customer concentration are
a plausible cause for the increased protability in already protable rms. We suggest that the
contrary results for unprotable rms largely reect the di¤ering stages of the relationship life cycle.
We hypothesize that early in the life cycle signicant relationship-specic expenses can increase costs
and impair protability. The signicant positive correlation between customer concentration and
SG&A expenses for negative OM rms is consistent with this hypothesis, but these connections
11Note that the skewed distribution of CC can cause the subsample correlations to fail to bracket the full sample
correlation, an illustration of Simpsons paradox.
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should be conrmed controlling for the covariates included in Patatoukas (2012).
4.1.2 Regression Analyses
We verify the net e¤ect of customer concentration on protability and costs in Table 4 which
presents the average coe¢ cients of Fama-MacBeth regressions using six rm operating characteris-
tics as the dependent variables. Following Patatoukas (2012) the independent variables we use are
customer concentration rank (Rank(CC)) and control variables for market value (MV ), rm age
(AGE), sales growth (GROWTH), an indicator variable for rms having more than one line of
business (CONGLO), and nancial leverage (FLEV ). The full sample results in Panel A show that
inclusion of negative operating margin rms has a profound e¤ect on the relation between customer
concentration and rm operations. Unlike Patatoukas(2012, 373) results, customer concentration
is negatively related to both ROA and ROE in the full sample. Customer concentration is also
negatively related to asset turnover (ATO) and positively related to SG&A expenses. These results
show that Patatoukas(2012) results do not generalize to rms with operating losses and that a
further explanation is required to explain how customer concentration a¤ects rm protability.
Panel B of Table 4 presents the same analysis for protable rms only. For these rms and using
the same set of control variables, we generally can conrm many of the ndings in Patatoukas (2012).
Customer concentration is positively related to ROA and ROE as well as prot margin (PM), but
we do not conrm, in our larger sample of positive OM rms, that customer concentration has
benecial e¤ects on asset turnover. In line with Patatoukas (2012) and arguments on the impact
of customer power in Kelly and Gosman (2000), we nd that suppliers with more concentrated
customer bases report signicantly lower gross margins. Patatoukas (2012) argues that the negative
e¤ects on gross margins can be o¤set if high CC rms spend less on SG&A expenses. As in
Patatoukas (2012) we nd this o¤setting e¤ect exists in this subsample. Positive operating margin
rms with higher customer concentration tend to spend signicantly less on SG&A expenses.
When we examine rms with negative operating margins in Panel C of Table 4, we nd that the
relation between customer concentration and rm operating characteristics is markedly di¤erent
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than it is for rms with positive operating margins. In Panel C, we nd that customer concentration
has a negative e¤ect on ROE; ROA; and prot margin (PM). Unlike the results for positive
operating margin rms in Panel B, the negative impact of customer concentration on gross margins
is not o¤set by lower SG&A expenses. In the SG&A regression reported in Column (6), the
coe¢ cient on customer concentration is signicantly positive.
To summarize, we expand upon one of the main tables in Patatoukas (2012, Table 2, Panel A) in
Table 4. While we nd generally consistent results regarding the e¤ects of customer concentration
in the subsample of positive operating margin rms, we nd contrary results in the subsample
of rms with negative operating margins. Furthermore, the coe¢ cients on the rank of customer
concentration in the negative operating margin subsample are larger in magnitude and of the
opposite sign to those in the subsample of positive operating margin rms.
4.1.3 Impact of customer concentration on operating leverage and demand uncer-
tainty
In Section 2 we develop the hypothesis that expenses and prots vary over the life-cycle of the major
customer relationship and this variation can explain the di¤erences we observe in how customer
concentration a¤ects protable and unprotable rms. The dynamics underlying the life cycle rely
on contentions about how the customer base a¤ects rm costs, initially on the patterns of cost-
rigidity in SG&A expenses. To demonstrate the relative importance of SG&A costs in our sample,
we rst show in Panel A of Table 5 average operating expenses. Cost of goods sold average 64.4% of
sales and SG&A expenses average 39.1%. As a component of SG&A expenses, advertising expense
averages only 1.0% of sales.12
Panel B of Table 5 examines the elasticity with respect to sales for cost of goods sold and
SG&A expenses, across ve di¤erent quintiles of customer concentration. Our examination of cost
elasticity is derived from the cost-xity arguments of Anderson et al. (2003) and Baumgarten,
12The latter gure indicates why the improvements in advertising expenses customer concentration allows do not
necessarily translate into operating protability.
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Bonenkamp and Homburg (2010). Cost elasticity with respect to sales measures the percentage
variation in costs relative to percentage variation in rm sales. We nd that for all rms, costs are
inelastic, varying less than one-to-one with sales variation. We also nd a distinct pattern in cost
elasticity: the higher a rms customer concentration, the lower its cost elasticity. The di¤erences
are signicant across the concentration quintiles, and particularly dramatic for SG&A elasticity.
SG&A cost elasticity is 0.79 for rms in the lowest customer concentration quintile falling to 0.56
in the highest customer concentration quintile. Economically, we infer from this data that rms
with higher customer concentration make greater xed investments in customer-specic SG&A
expenses. They do this to capture potential operating e¢ ciencies. Such investments allow rms to
more easily expand their operations when major customers increase their demand (Banker et al.
2014). However, when demand falls, these customer-specic xed investments are less transferable
to other customers than more general costs.
To understand the e¤ects of major customer demand we examine how sales volatility varies with
customer concentration. Banker et al. (2014) postulate that demand uncertainty (measured by the
volatility of sales), can lead to lower cost elasticity. They argue that rms facing high demand
uncertainty make large xed investments to capitalize in high-demand states. Firms that do not
make such investments would, due to high short-term adjustment costs, be unable to capitalize on
the high prots available in high-demand states. Their arguments would dovetail into our nd-
ings on cost elasticity and customer concentration if demand uncertainty increases with customer
concentration.
When we examine demand uncertainty across customer concentration quintiles in Panel C of
Table 5, we nd that demand uncertainty signicantly increases from the lowest customer con-
centration quintile (0.19) to the highest customer concentration quintile (0.32). If one considers
rm sales in a portfolio context, then this nding makes sense. Firms with a few major customers
are relatively undiversied in sales and thus, customer-specic demand shocks are more likely to
impact their sales compared to rms with diversied customer bases.
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We verify the validity of the univariate sorts conducted in Panels B and C using Fama-MacBeth
style regressions in Panel D. The monotonically increasing relation we nd between customer con-
centration and demand uncertainty complements the arguments of both Patatoukas (2012) and
Banker et al. (2014). If the relationship encourages rms to make customer-specic investments,
then rms will have more inelastic cost structures and potentially higher prots should the rela-
tionship succeed. However, the higher xed costs incurred coupled with higher demand uncertainty
could lead to a greater probability of nancial distress for these rms. We investigate this issue in
detail in the empirical tests below.
4.2 Impact of customer concentration on rm failure and cost of debt
Observing that rms with high customer concentration have lower cost elasticity and higher demand
uncertainty, we next investigate the relation between customer concentration (CC) and probability
of rm failure. For this purpose we replicate the rm failure model of Campbell et al. (2008) to
highlight the incremental power of customer concentration to explain nancial distress.
4.2.1 Failure Prediction
Earlier we speculate that customer concentration could be risky for supplier rms. We support this
contention by analyzing whether our measure of customer concentration Rank(CC) is related to
the probability of rm failure. To accomplish this we run a dynamic model predicting rm failure
for all rms over the period between 1980 and 2007. The dependent variable is the dichotomous
outcome variable: rm failure or no failure in a particular rm-year.
We use the framework in Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) who use nancial and market
variables to predict default.13 We adopt their nomenclature for the set of predictive variables: Total
liabilities to the market value of assets (TLMTA); net income to market value of assets (NIMTA);
the standard deviation of stock returns over the previous three months (SIGMA); market to book
13 In unreported results we conduct a similar, albeit a static, failure prediction analysis for rms that recently have
gone public in order to assess the impact of customer concentration on the likelihood of rm failure in the ve years
that immediately follow an IPO. Following Demers and Joos (2007), we obtain qualitatively similar results.
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ratio (MB), relative size of the rm as measured by the log of the market value of the rm relative
to the log of market value of the S&P 500 Index (RSIZE); the ratio of rm cash holdings to the
market value of total assets (CASHMTA); and the prior months stock returns relative to the
S&P 500 Index returns over the same time period (EXRET ):14
Campbell et al. (2008) nd that this set of independent variables is able to predict default. We
examine this nding for our sample in Column (1) of Panel A in Table 6. In this specication, we
use the independent variables proposed by Campbell et al. (2008) to estimate the failure probability
for 48,948 rm-year observations that have a corresponding customer base concentration value. For
our sample of rms with customer concentration data, we nd results that conrm the Campbell
et al. (2008) model of failure predictability. The model has a psuedo-R2 of 20.9% and all of the
independent variables are signicant with the expected sign.
In Column (2) of Panel A in Table 6 we add the measure of customer concentration, Rank(CC);
to the regression. We nd signicant results from including the customer-base concentration vari-
able. The coe¢ cient on Rank(CC) in Column (2) is positive and signicant. This result demon-
strates that customer concentration captures failure-related information that is not already reected
in the existing predictors of rm failure.
In Column (3) of Panel A we expand the sample to include rms that do not have any major
customer data (NoCC): Although customer concentration increases the likelihood of failure in
sample, we do not know what the global e¤ect of major customers might be. By denition, it is
impossible to calculate CC for rms without major customers, so we split up the entire sample into
ve groups, theNoCC group, and four categories of customer concentration. Firms with Rank(CC)
values between zero and zero point three are categorized as Rank(CC)_1, rms with Rank(CC)
values between zero point three and zero point ve are categorized as Rank(CC)_2, rms with
Rank(CC) values between zero point ve and zero point eight are categorized as Rank(CC)_3
and nally rms with Rank(CC) values between zero point eight and one are grouped under
14All nancial variables are observable 12 months prior to the failure event to avoid endogenous relations being
recorded between the predictive variables and the failure event.
19
Rank(CC)_4.15
Given that the probability of rm failure increases in Rank(CC), this regression produces the
surprising result that the NoCC rms have signicantly higher failure probabilities than some
rms with major customers. Specically, Rank(CC)_1 rms have signicantly lower likelihood of
failure than NoCC rms. Within the four Rank(CC) categories, failure increases monotonically
with Rank(CC), as in the column (2) regression, but the di¤erences are not always statistically
signicant.
Figure 2 and Panel B of Table 6 presents the predicted failure probabilities for the ve di¤erent
groups. These data illustrate the non-linear relation between customer concentration and the
probability of failure. The predicted probability of failure for NoCC rms is 1.8 percent. This
likelihood falls to 1.3 percent for the Rank(CC)_1 rms, and then rises monotonically as customer
concentration increases, a result consistent with the results in Panel A.
To understand why NoCC rms have higher failure probabilities than Rank(CC)_1 rms
Panel C focuses on four important rm characteristics associated with rm failure. Panel C reveals
that rms that have no major customers (NoCC) are very similar in terms of protability, return
volatility and cash holdings to rms with low customer-base concentration (Rank(CC)_1). We
document, however, a large di¤erence in the leverage utilized by these two di¤erent types of rms:
Rank(CC)_1 rms have markedly lower leverage than NoCC rms. This nding suggests that
even rms with diversied customer bases (Rank(CC)_1) are aware of the asymmetric bargaining
power of their major customers and thus choose to reduce their nancial leverage. Firms in the
Rank(CC)_2, Rank(CC)_3 and Rank(CC)_4 groups also have markedly lower leverage levels
than rms in the NoCC group. Furthermore, as customer concentration increases rms steadily
increase their cash holdings; a second action that reduces their failure probability. These capital
structure changes lower the failure probability, relative to NoCC rms, for Rank(CC)_1 rms.
However, the same strategy does not reduce the failure probabilities for rms in Rank(CC)_2,
15The tested specication in Column (3) drops the Rank(CC)_3 variable to avoid the dummy variable trap.
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Rank(CC)_3 and Rank(CC)_4: This is because as customer base concentration increases idio-
syncratic volatility signicantly rises and protability is signicantly reduced (Panel C). Panel A
conrms that both leverage and cash holdings are signicant predictors of rm failure. Hence
we conclude that the non-linear relation between customer concentration and failure in Panel B
represents the interaction between customer concentration, which increases failure probability, and
leverage, which decreases failure probability.
Banerjee et al. (2008) nd a negative relation between major customers and leverage for a sam-
ple of durable goods manufacturers in the 1980s and 1990s. Their explanation for this relation is
that rms reduce leverage to protect themselves from the possibility of major customer bankruptcy.
While we agree that their explanation is likely to be present, aside from extending their result to
a much broader range of rms, we also add to their analysis by proposing that the debt markets
are capable of determining the risks from major customers. If this is the case, then debt should
be costlier, or credit ratings more negative as customer concentration increases. We proceed to
empirically test this conjecture.
4.2.2 Customer base concentration and cost of debt
In Table 7, we estimate whether customer concentration has a signicant e¤ect on a rms credit
rating. Standard and Poors (S&P), an important credit rating agency, records rm-specic credit
ratings on a letter scale running from AAA rating for the strongest credits, to D for rms in default.
Compustat records S&P ratings as a numeric score for each rm running from a 2 (AAA rated) to
27 (D rated). As the rm credit rating is on an ordinally-ranked scale, standard OLS assumptions
do not apply. Therefore, we estimate rm credit rating using an ordered logit model.16 Credit
ratings are widely used to compensate bondholders for credit risk and represent compensation for
rm-specic credit risk as well as exposure to systematic default risk and, as such, reects the rms
cost of debt.
16The scale has gaps occuring at random intervals, including numbers 3 and 22. However, by construction, credit
rating is ordered, so we use an appropriate econometric method. OLS results are consistent with the results presented
in in the paper.
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Column (1) of Table 7 documents a negative association between customer-base concentration
and credit rating; the greater is Rank(CC), the worse the rms credit rating. Column (2) controls
variables known to a¤ect credit rating and nds that the Rank(CC) coe¢ cient is 0.564 (t-statistic
= 7.34). This coe¢ cient is also economically signicant. For example, the mean rating for the
50th percentile of Rank(CC) is BB, but increasing customer concentration to the 75th percentile
of Rank(CC) drops the credit rating to BB-, increasing the cost of issuing debt. We nd that
customer-base concentration not only leads to a higher probability of rm failure, but also to a
higher cost of debt. We interpret this result as evidence that, in addition to the reason posited by
Banerjee et al. (2008), the cost channel plays a signicant role in explaining the leverage decisions
of rms with major customers.
4.3 Impact of changes in customer concentration on rm value and performance
In the previous sections we document that, in the full sample, customer concentration leads to higher
operating leverage, SG&A cost xity and demand uncertainty culminating in higher probability of
failure as well as higher cost of debt. Since all of these consequences are costly, it seems unlikely
that rms would seek out major customers unless there were o¤setting benets. In this section
we investigate the valuation implications of changes in customer base concentration, Rank(CC).
We combine two Patatoukas (2012) analyses in Table 8 where we estimate the e¤ect of changes in
customer concentration rank on contemporaneous and future abnormal returns, as well as future
operating performance.
In column (1) of Panel A of Table 8, we show that contemporaneous buy-and-hold equity
returns are positively related to changes in customer base concentration, Rank(CC); suggesting
that investorsbelieve that increasing reliance on major customers is a positive development for the
rm. This contemporaneous result is consistent with Patatoukas (2012). In contrast, in column
(2) we nd that the market seems to incorporate the valuation impact of customer concentration
in the current year; although buy and hold abnormal returns are positive in year t+ 1 (relative to
the year of customer concentration change), they are not statistically signicant.
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To test a causal relation between changes in Rank(CC) and operating performance, we regress
next periods changes in ROA and SGA on changes in customer concentration and changes in a
set of control variables. As in Patatoukas (2012) we calculate the e¤ects of changes in the rank of
customer concentration to better dene the direction of causality between customer concentration
and rm operating characteristics. Patatoukas (2012) nds that changes in customer concentration,
Rank(CC); have a signicantly positive e¤ect on changes in ROA (ROA); and a signicantly
negative e¤ect on changes in SG&A expenses (SGA):17 Columns (3) and (4) of Panel A estimates
these regressions using our sample and nds that changes in customer concentration rank are
signicantly negatively related to changes in ROA and signicantly positively related to changes in
SG&A expenses. These results are consistent with the evidence on customer concentration and rm
performance presented earlier; an increase in customer concentration leads to both higher selling,
general and administrative costs and lower protability in the next period.18 Our contention is
that early in the relationship life-cycle, investments in the customer-specic relationship tend to
increase costs and impair performance. Eventually, if the relationship succeeds, these investments
result in the lower costs and improved protability documented in Patatoukas (2012).
Panel B of Table 8 attempts to provide an answer to two puzzles driven by the Panel A results:
why are contemporaneous returns positive when customer concentration increases, and why initial
costs are so high that the full sample contains a negative relation between Rank(CC) and operating
performance? We calculate the change in sales for Initial relationships, those years in which a rm
acquires a new major customer. To control for confounding characteristics that might inuence
our results, we match each Initial rm to a rm with no major customers. We match Initial
and comparable rms by previous years rm age, size, book-to-market ratio,and sales growth. We
present year-by-year results of Initial rm sales growth, comparable rm sales growth, and calculate
17Patatoukas (2012) also nds a positive relation between changes in customer concentration and changes in ROE.
We do not include ROE changes as the specication in Patatoukas (2012) contains no leverage control. When we
estimate the Table 8 regressions for changes in ROE with a leverage control variable, the coe¢ cients on changes in
customer concentration are insignicantly negative.
18These results would be in complete agreement with our observations in Table 7 as lower protability and higher
costs would inevitably lead to a higher cost of debt capital. In column (2) we nd no relationship between changes
in customer base concentration and future equity returns, suggesting that the impact of customer base concentration
on cost of debt capital is driven largely by an increase in expected losses rather than an increase in systematic risk.
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the di¤erence. In 25 of the 27 years that we can estimate, Initial rms have higher sales growth than
do comparable rms. This di¤erence averages an impressive 11.6 percent sales growth advantage
for Initial rms (t-statistic = 6.41). In the following year Initial rms average 18.6 percent sales
growth, 5.6 percent more than comparable rms. This sales growth evidence reconciles the results
observed on contemporaneous returns in Panel A with the evidence presented earlier in the paper.
Initiating new major customer relationships produces economically signicant sales gains. This
increase in cash ow is apparently recognized by the equity investors, who provide the rm with
higher contemporaneous returns.
However, the benets from acquiring a major customer do not immediately become apparent
in operating performance. We suggest that the growth in Initial rm sales is economically large,
and thus requires considerable customer-specic investment in the early years of the relationship.
These investments are not immediately amortized, rather they provide long-term benets (Jap and
Anderson (2007)) that eventually improve operating performance and increase protability. We
proceed to test this contention in the following section.
4.4 Customer concentration and the life cycle of supplier-customer relation-
ships
4.4.1 Impact of duration of customer links on rm performance and risk
To substantiate our life-cycle hypothesis we need to determine rst, that there are di¤erent stages
with di¤erential e¤ects on rm operations over the life cycle, and second, that these stages unfold in
a way that is consistent with our hypothesis. Specically, we have argued that SG&A investments
should increase early in the relationship and that these investments lower protability, but these
e¤ects should reverse as the relationship matures. To do this we replicate our analysis in Panel
A of Table 4 controlling for the duration of the rms relationship with a major customer. We
separate 22,311 rm-year observations with identiable customer data into ve quintiles based
on the duration of the relationship with major customers.19 Relationship age is measured by
19178 observations are lost from the 22,489 in Table 2 Panel B due to missing covariate observations.
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LINKAGE which is a weighted average of the (log) years that a rm has maintained sales to its
major customers. We then sort all observations into quintiles every year based on the value of
LINKAGE: The dummy variables LA_Q1; LA_Q2; LA_Q3; LA_Q4 and LA_Q5 are equal to
one if the rm-year observation falls into the rst, second, third, fourth or fth quintile of average
age of major customer relationships in a particular year.
To analyze the e¤ects of LINKAGE parsimoniously, we interact the rank of customer base
concentration, Rank(CC); with the quintile dummy variables. In this specication the coe¢ -
cient on Rank(CC) represents the baseline e¤ects of the youngest relationships and the remaining
four dummy variables create interactive slope coe¢ cients that measure the change in the e¤ect of
customer concentration on rm operations as the relationship matures. Our life-cycle hypothesis
predicts that, for rms with the youngest relationships, Rank(CC) will have a positive a¤ect on
SG&A expenses and a negative a¤ect on ROA.
In Panel A of Table 9, we estimate the e¤ects of LINKAGE by examining the coe¢ cient on
Rank(CC) as the relationship matures. We rst note that the coe¢ cients on the interactive vari-
ables are, with the exception of the gross margin regression in column (5), statistically signicant.
This indicates that the stage of the relationship life cycle is important in measuring the e¤ects of
customer concentration on rm operations and protability. Further, we observe that all the ad-
verse e¤ects of customer concentration are mitigated as the duration of the relationship increases.
In column (1) we regress ROA on Rank(CC) and the standard set of controls utilized throughout
the paper. Results in Column (1) show that the coe¢ cient on Rank(CC) is statistically signicant
and economically relevant at -0.06, suggesting that return on assets is six percent lower for rms
with youngest relationships. The interaction of Rank(CC) with the dummy variable LA_Q2 is
statistically signicant and equal to 0.04, suggesting that a signicant portion of the adverse impact
of customer concentration on protability is alleviated as the major customer relationship matures
into the second quintile of relationship age. Rank(CC)  LA_Q3; which denotes the interaction
between Rank(CC) and the dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the rm is in the
third quintile of LINKAGE is 0.059, suggesting that rms can eliminate all the adverse e¤ects of
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customer base concentration on protability once the duration of the link reaches approximately
four years. Subsequent rows reveal that the adverse e¤ects of customer base concentration on ROA
are fully reversed for the two top quintiles of relationship age.
We observe qualitatively very similar results in columns 2 through 4, for return on equity,
ROE; asset turnover, ATO; and prot margin, PM; regressions. These results suggest that, for
all measures of protability, adverse e¤ects of customer concentration are reduced, eliminated or
reversed as the links with major customers mature. In column (5) we regress gross margin GM on
Rank(CC); interaction of Rank(CC) with the linkage dummy variables and the usual set of control
variables. Column (5) reveals that the adverse e¤ect of customer concentration on gross margin
is not negated with the duration of the major customer links, suggesting that major customers
continue to exercise their bargaining power throughout the duration of the relationship. In column
(6) we show that long duration links with major customers lead to large e¢ ciency gains in the
form of reduced SG&A expenses. In fact, our results suggest that rms in the top two LINKAGE
quintiles are able to fully amortize the large xed SG&A investments incurred at the beginning of
the relationship. In all the analyses conducted in Panel A, we control for rm age, AGE; as well as
rm size, MV; sales growth rate, GROWTH; the indicator variable for rms having more than one
line of business, CONGLO; and nancial leverage, FLEV: Perhaps the most signicant of these
control variables is rm age, AGE: Controlling for AGE establishes that the impact of the duration
of the customer links, LINKAGE; on rm performance is independent from the impact of AGE
on rm performance. This result establishes the the relationship life-cycle e¤ects are distinct from
the life cycle of the rm.
In Panel A we are conned to the subsample of rms with identiable customers. In Panel
B, we use rm age, AGE; as a proxy for LINKAGE: Correlation of AGE with LINKAGE is
economically signicant (0.42). This statistic indicates that while Panel A identies a relationship
life-cycle e¤ect distinct from the life-cycle of the rm, AGE may contain enough information
about the relationship age to allow us to determine if relationship life cycle e¤ects exist in the full
sample. Using AGE; instead of LINKAGE allows us to expand the data set from 22,311 rm-year
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observations to 49,118 rm-year observations. Results in Panel B are qualitatively very similar to
the results in Panel A. Having established the distinct nature of the impact of LINKAGE; on rm
performance from the impact of rm age, AGE; on rm performance in Panel A, the interpretation
of the results in Panel B is clear: As supplier rms mature they are able to reduce the adverse
impact of customer base concentration on rm performance. A careful examination reveals that rm
maturity does not alleviate the adverse impact of customer base concentration on gross margins,
GM: This observation suggests to us that rms do not obtain additional bargaining power with
their major customers by simply surviving. Results in column (6) of Panel B in Table 9 suggest
that the reversal of the adverse e¤ects of customer concentration on rm performance follows the
same pattern observed in Panel A: Firms are able to reverse the adverse e¤ects of customer base
concentration on rm performance by reducing SG&A expenses as they mature. Thus, although
rm age is an imperfect instrument for LINKAGE, the results in Panel B suggest that young
rms tend to have young relationships with their major customer and that rm age contains enough
information on relationship duration to substitute for LINKAGE in future studies on the life-cycle
e¤ects of major customer relationships when LINKAGE is unavailable.
In Panel C of Table 9 we investigate the impact of the relationship life-cycle on the connection
between customer concentration, SG&A elasticity and demand uncertainty. In Table 5, we propose
that the economic drivers of our full sample results are increases in cost xity and demand uncer-
tainty. To test whether our life-cycle hypothesis can explain changes in these underlying factors
and thus the protability results we present in Panels A and B, we regress the elasticity of SG&A
expenses, SG&AElasticity; and demand uncertainty on Rank(CC); the interaction of Rank(CC)
with LINKAGE; (Rank(CC)  LINKAGE); and a set of control variables.
Columns (1) through (3) of Panel C report signicant life-cycle e¤ects on SG&AElasticity:
Consistent with the levels results presented in Table 5, the coe¢ cient on Rank(CC) is signicantly
negative. However, the coe¢ cient on the interactive variable, Rank(CC)  LINKAGE; is signi-
cantly positive. The interactive coe¢ cient shows us that, as the relationship matures, the negative
association between customer base concentration and xity of SG&A expenses reverses. We in-
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terpret this result as supportive evidence for the conjecture that the bulk of the customer-specic
investments occur early in the relationship and as the relationship matures, the initial operating
risk is ameliorated.
In Table 5 we establish a positive relationship between customer concentration and demand
uncertainty. Columns (4) through (6) in Panel C of Table 9 clearly document that the positive
association between customer-base concentration and demand uncertainty is reduced as the dura-
tion of the relationship increases. This suggests that durable relationships with major customers
eventually lead to less volatile revenues.
The results in Table 9 suggest that as the relationships between rms and their major customers
mature, they amortize a signicant portion of their customer-specic SG&A investments. This
amortization gradually increases rm protability and reduces operating risk.
4.4.2 Impact of customer concentration on operating e¢ ciency throughout the rela-
tionship life-cycle
Patatoukas (2012) examines the e¤ect of customer concentration on specic operating e¢ ciency
metrics. To determine how our life-cycle hypothesis applies to the details of rm operations, we
examine the e¤ect of customer concentration on inventory, asset turnover components, advertising,
as well as variables that measure working capital e¢ ciency, while controlling for rm size, age, sales
growth, lines of business and nancial leverage. The key independent variables in this analysis are
Rank(CC) in Panel A of Table 10 to measure baseline customer concentration e¤ects and the
interactive variable Rank(CC)  LINKAGE in Panel B: The latter variable will indicate, which
operating variables, if any, are a¤ected by the life cycle of the major customer relationship.
By examining the Rank(CC) coe¢ cients in Panel A of Table 10 we nd that many of Pata-
toukas(2012) conclusions about customer concentration and operating e¢ ciency hold in our ex-
panded sample. Having large and important customers allows suppliers to reduce inventory holding
costs (IHLD), and improve inventory turnover. This nding suggests that the ties that develop
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between the rm and its major customers allow the rm to e¤ectively manage its inventory. With
the exception of cash turnover and advertising expenses, the other components of asset turnover
are consistent with the contention that customer concentration improves operating e¢ ciency. How-
ever, customer concentration has a signicantly negative e¤ect on cash turnover.20 In columns (8)
through (10) we examine the e¤ect of customer concentration on working capital e¢ ciency. We
nd that customer concentration increases days receivable, reduces days of inventory, and reduces
the provision for doubtful accounts.
The coe¢ cient on Rank(CC)  LINKAGE in Panel B of Table 10 reveals that long duration
links with major customers can benet rms signicantly. Columns (1) and (2) examine inventory
management. In column (1) we note that although inventory holdings tend to increase as rela-
tionships mature, the increase does not appear large enough to o¤set the overall inventory benets
from customer concentration. Column (2) shows that all of the signicant inventory turnover im-
provements reported in Panel A come as the relationship matures, as the coe¢ cient on Rank(CC)
is no longer signicant, but inventory turnover signicantly improves as link age increases. We see
a similar pattern for intangibles turnover in column (5) as signicantly higher intangibles turnover
(INTANG) is a result driven by increases in LINKAGE. Columns (3) and (4) reveal that re-
ceivables turnover and PP&E turnover do not improve with the relationship life-cycle. Column (6)
shows that cash turnover improves for concentrated suppliers that have long duration links with
their major customers. This suggests that longer duration links with major customers help build
trust between the parties which leads to more e¢ cient deployment of cash. We observe in column
(7) that while earlier results document that relationship life-cycle improvements are observed for
SG&A expenses, the same is not true for advertising expenses. The benets from a reduction in
advertising expenditures are present in this sample, but importance of the relationship itself, rather
than the relationship duration seems to be the driving factor producing this result. Finally columns
(8) through (10) show that all working capital e¢ ciency improvements come with time. As the
20 In Panel C of Table 6 we nd that cash holdings increase with customer-base concentration. This nding is
consistent with high customer concentration rms holding higher precautionary cash balances, which impairs their
cash turnover.
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relationship matures, the ratio of accounts receivable to sales (DAY S_RCV BLE), the ratio of
inventory to cost of goods sold (DAY S_INV T ), and the provision for doubtful accounts relative
to accounts receivable (DOUBTFUL) all decrease.
5 Conclusion
All supplier rms face the dilemma of whether to cater to a few dominant customers or whether
to seek a more diversied customer base. A long line of research dating back to Galbraith (1952)
suggests that major customers are threats to rmsoperating prots because, as important cus-
tomers with signicant bargaining power, they can demand price discounts and other concessions
from suppliers. In a recent study, Patatoukas (2012) challenges this view. Rather than looking
at industry-level concentration, as in previous studies, he creates a rm-specic measure of cus-
tomer concentration and nds that protable rms with high customer concentration benet from
customer-specic investments through improved operating e¢ ciencies and reduced SG&A expenses.
In this paper we use a recently expanded data set of sales to major customers to study the
economics of supplier rms. By examining all such rms, whether protable or not, we outline
a relationship life-cycle hypothesis wherein rms with major customers face signicant operating
risks. These risks arise because establishing and maintaining relationships with major customers
require large, xed investments, especially early in the relationship life-cycle. However, as the
relationship matures, these rms can eventually benet from some of the operating e¢ ciencies
documented in Patatoukas (2012).
We nd that in the subsample of rms with positive operating margins, the correlation between
ROA and customer concentration is positive, while the correlation between SG&A expenses and
customer concentration is negative. However, in the subsample of rms with negative operating
margins the relations reverse as the correlation between ROA and customer concentration is neg-
ative, while the correlation between SG&A expenses and customer concentration is positive. The
exclusion of rms with negative operating margins from an analysis investigating the impact of
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customer concentration on the operations of rms thus introduces a bias. Firms with positive op-
erating margins appear to be the set of rms in mature relationships with their major customers,
while the adverse e¤ects of customer concentration are strongly evident in rms that are at the
early stages of their relationship life cycles.
We nd that many of the operating e¢ ciencies documented in Patatoukas (2012) exist, but
these benets are negated by the negative impact of customer concentration on SG&A expenses.
We conjecture that at the outset of a relationship with a major customer rms make customer-
specic investments, particularly in SG&A expenses, and these customer-specic investments are
harder to transfer to other customers should the customer-supplier relationship deteriorate. We
nd that rms with higher customer concentration have more inelastic SG&A expenses and costs
of goods sold, a nding that supports our conjecture. Such customer-specic investments lead
to higher xity of costs for rms with high customer concentration resulting in higher operating
leverage.
The operating leverage e¤ect enhances protability in protable periods while increasing the
rms losses in unprotable periods, consequently increases the risk of nancial distress and the cost
of debt. Firms with major customers respond to these costs by signicantly reducing leverage. Thus,
customer concentration brings signicant costs and benets to the rm. Identifying these costs and
benets over the full range of the relationship life-cycle allows us to reconcile the conventional
wisdom with Patatoukas(2012) results.
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
This table describes the main variables used in this study.  Supplier and customer firm characteristics are defined as in 
Patatoukas (2012). The customer-base concentration variable (CC) measures the extent to which a firm’s customer base is more 
or less concentrated. Supplier-customer relationships are obtained from the COMPUSTAT Customer Segment files. Market 
equity prices, accounting profitability measures and other financial statement items are from the CSRP-COMPUSTAT merged 
database. In Table 6, we run dynamic logistic regressions as in Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) (hereafter CHS (2008)). 
Variables used in predicting firm failures with the dynamic CHS (2008) failure model are defined as in CHS (2008). 
    
Variable Definition 
Supplier Firm Characteristics as defined in Patatoukas (2012) 
CC Customer-base concentration measure  (0 ≤ CC ≤ 1)  
ΔCC Annual change in CC  
MV Market value of equity  
AGE Firm age of the supplier firm, measured from the time of the firm’s Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
GROWTH Annual sales growth  
ROA Income before extraordinary items / Beginning of year book value of assets  
ROE Income before extraordinary items / Beginning of year book value of equity  
SGA Selling, general, and administrative expenses / Sales  
GM Gross margin of the supplier firm: (Sales - Cost of goods sold) / Sales 
PM Profit margin of the supplier firm: Income before extraordinary items / Sales 
IHLD Inventory / Beginning of year book value of assets  
ATO Asset turnover of the supplier firm: Sales / Beginning of year book value of assets 
FLEV Beginning of year book value of assets / Beginning of year book value of equity 
CONGLO An indicator variable equal to 1 if the supplier firm reports at least two business segments 
  
Default Prediction Variables Used in Table 6, as defined in Campbell Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008)  
TLMTA Total liabilities / Market value of total assets* 
CASHMTA Cash and short-term assets / Market value of total assets* 
SIGMA Standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock returns over the past 3 months 
MB Market-to-Book ratio  
RSIZE Log ratio of market capitalization to S&P 500 index 
PRICE Log price per share 
EXRET Monthly log excess return on equity relative to S&P 500 index 
  
    
 
*We follow CHS (2008) and adjust the market value of total assets. Adjusted market value of total assets is equal to the book value 
of total assets as measured in Compustat quarterly (data item: ATQ) plus ten percent of the difference between the market and book 
values of equity.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the main variables 
This table reports the mean, standard deviation, skewness, 25th percentile, median, and 75thpercentile values of the main 
variables used in this study. MV is in millions of US dollars while AGE is in years. The descriptive statistics are based on the 
samples used in the regression analyses. Our samples include firms from 1977 to 2007. We only include non-financial firms 
which have non-missing customer-base concentration measures, non-missing accounting profitability measures, and non-
negative book values of equity. Panel A describes our full sample of 49,760 supplier firm year observations where a customer 
concentration (CC) value can be assigned to a supplier firm. Panel B reports the same values for the same set of variables for 
the subset of firms that have identifiable major customers. Panel C divides the full sample utilized in Panel A into two groups: 
supplier firm year observations with positive operating margins and supplier firm year observations with negative operating 
margins. The mean differences between the two groups and the corresponding t-statistics are reported on the right-hand side of 
Panel C.  
 
 
                
Panel A: Full sample       
        
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Skewness 25th Percent. Median 
75th 
Percent. 
CC 49,760  0.101  0.147  2.930  0.014  0.046  0.125  
ΔCC 43,048  -0.003  0.094  -0.534  -0.018  0.000  0.015  
MV 49,335  805.6  3,886.7  12.0  16.5 65.7  318.6  
AGE 49,760  10.3  9.0  1.3  3.0  7.0  15.0  
GROWTH 49,667  0.22  0.62  4.60  -0.03  0.10  0.29  
ROA 49,760  -0.01  0.22  -2.77  -0.05  0.03  0.09  
ROE 49,760  -0.03  0.51  -2.90  -0.10  0.07  0.18  
SGA 49,760  0.39  0.63  6.12  0.14  0.24  0.40  
IHLD 49,410  0.16  0.15  0.83  0.03  0.14  0.26  
TLMTA 49,256  0.35  0.24  0.51  0.15  0.31  0.52  
CASHMTA 49,254 0.11 0.14 2.72 0.02 0.06 0.14 
                
Panel B: Supplier firms with the link age information 
        
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Skewness 25th Percent. Median 
75th 
Percent. 
CC 22,489  0.116  0.148 2.785  0.024 0.063 0.148 
ΔCC 20,616 -0.005 0.092 -0.682 -0.022 -0.001 0.017 
MV 22,375 997.0 4,596.6 10.4 19.3 76.1 359.7 
AGE 22,489 10.7 9.3 1.3 4.0 8.0 15.0  
GROWTH 22,464 0.20 0.56 4.46 -0.04 0.10  0.29  
ROA 22,489 -0.01  0.21 -2.70 -0.05 0.03  0.09  
ROE 22,489 -0.02 0.49 -2.92 -0.09 0.07  0.18  
SGA 22,489 0.37 0.55 6.34 0.13 0.23 0.40  
IHLD 22,338 0.16  0.14 0.83  0.03  0.14  0.25 
TLMTA 22,337 0.35  0.23 0.52 0.15  0.31  0.52  
CASHMTA 22,337 0.11 0.14 2.68 0.02 0.06 0.15 
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Panel C: Profitable firm years (positive-OM sample) vs. unprofitable firm years (negative-OM sample)     
             
 Positive OM sample  Negative OM sample  Mean  
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Median   Observations Mean Std. Dev. Median   differences (t-stat) 
CC 38,924  0.090  0.133  0.040   10,836  0.142  0.184  0.072   -0.052  (-27.63) 
ΔCC 33,841  -0.001  0.078  0.000   9,207  -0.010  0.136  -0.002   0.009  (5.85) 
MV 38,589  990.2  4,344.9  91.9   10,746  143.0  999.0  23.2   847.2  (35.11) 
AGE 38,924  11.1  9.4  8.0   10,836  7.3  6.7  5.0   3.9  (48.63) 
GROWTH 38,902  0.22  0.49  0.12   10,765  0.21  0.93  -0.03   0.01  (0.92) 
ROA 38,924  0.06  0.10  0.05   10,836  -0.28  0.29  -0.20   0.34  (120.82) 
ROE 38,924  0.11  0.31  0.11   10,836  -0.51  0.74  -0.34   0.63  (86.44) 
SGA 38,924  0.23  0.15  0.20   10,836  0.96  1.15  0.60   -0.73  (-65.67) 
IHLD 38,627  0.17  0.15  0.15   10,783  0.14  0.15  0.10   0.02  (15.16) 
TLMTA 38,534  0.36  0.23  0.33   10,722  0.30  0.24  0.24   0.06  (22.81) 
CASHMTA 38,532 0.09 0.11 0.05  10,722 0.17 0.21 0.09  -0.08 (-38.58) 
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Figure 1: Time-series trend of customer-base concentration  
This figure plots the time series of the cross sectional median of customer-base concentration over the 1977-2007 
period. The line chart shows the time-series trend of the yearly median customer-base concentration measure (CC) 
and the bar chart shows the number of supplier firms that report their major customers in COMPUSTAT customer 
segment files. 
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Table 3: Pearson and Spearman correlations 
This table  reports the Pearson (above) and Spearman (below) correlation coefficients for the main variables used in our 
study. Panel A employs the full sample with available customer concentration (CC) values, whereas Panels B and C report 
the correlations for firms with positive operating margins (OM) and firms with negative operating margins, respectively. All 
correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the one percent level (significant at p < 0.01) except for the correlations 
denoted by "a" (significant at p < 0.05) and the ones denoted by "b" (statistically insignificant). 
                    
Panel A: Full sample         
  CC MV AGE GROWTH ROA ROE SGA TLMTA CASHMTA 
CC 
 
-0.11  -0.10  0.08  -0.11  -0.08  0.18  -0.12  0.10  
MV -0.13  
 
0.19  0.06  0.25  0.22  -0.11  -0.28  -0.13  
AGE -0.11  0.18  
 
-0.21  0.16  0.12  -0.18  0.14  -0.08  
GROWTH 0.00b 0.18  -0.18  
 
-0.04  -0.02  0.07  -0.14  -0.07  
ROA -0.10  0.34  0.12  0.32  
 
0.75  -0.56  -0.03  -0.09  
ROE -0.11  0.34  0.12  0.31  0.92  
 
-0.38  -0.05  -0.05  
SGA 0.05  -0.19  -0.21  -0.06  -0.36  -0.37   -0.40  0.28  
TLMTA -0.14  -0.27  0.15  -0.21  -0.23  -0.15  -0.25  
 
-0.20  
CASHMTA 0.11  -0.05  -0.05  -0.08  -0.04  -0.09  0.21  -0.27    
          
Panel B: Positive-OM sample        
  CC MV AGE GROWTH ROA ROE SGA TLMTA CASHMTA 
CC 
 
-0.10  -0.09  0.08  0.03  0.01  -0.04  -0.09  0.10  
MV -0.12  
 
0.17  0.04  0.21  0.15  -0.05  -0.31  -0.12  
AGE -0.09  0.17  
 
-0.21  -0.04  0.00b -0.12  0.11  -0.02  
GROWTH 0.03  0.12  -0.23  
 
0.16  0.11  0.02  -0.13  -0.06  
ROA 0.01a 0.24  -0.03  0.35  
 
0.63  -0.05  -0.44  0.03  
ROE -0.02  0.25  -0.01  0.34  0.89  
 
-0.06  -0.23  -0.01b 
SGA -0.07  -0.09  -0.11  0.02  -0.01a -0.09   -0.37  0.24  
TLMTA -0.10  -0.29  0.12  -0.24  -0.52  -0.33  -0.35  
 
-0.22  
CASHMTA 0.10  -0.05  -0.02  -0.04  0.09  -0.02  0.24  -0.28    
          
Panel C: Negative-OM sample        
  CC MV AGE GROWTH ROA ROE SGA TLMTA CASHMTA 
CC 
 
0.01b -0.06  0.09  -0.07  -0.02a 0.23  -0.16  0.01b 
MV 0.01b 
 
0.03  0.12  -0.04  0.01b 0.09  -0.42  0.03  
AGE -0.06  0.03  
 
-0.24  0.19  0.10  -0.19  0.18  -0.08  
GROWTH 0.00b 0.19  -0.20  
 
-0.22  -0.13  0.11  -0.17  -0.08  
ROA -0.09  0.00b 0.22  -0.09  
 
0.65  -0.45  0.19  0.12  
ROE -0.03  0.07  0.14  -0.05  0.84  
 
-0.23  0.01b 0.16  
SGA 0.17  0.14  -0.26  0.05  -0.49  -0.30   -0.51  0.22  
TLMTA -0.18  -0.43  0.18  -0.21  0.17  -0.06  -0.34  
 
-0.13  
CASHMTA 0.04  0.14  -0.05  -0.08  0.12  0.24  0.12  -0.15    
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Table 4: Customer-base concentration and supplier firm performance 
This table reports the results of yearly cross-sectional regressions of accounting performance measures on Rank(CC) and a 
set of control variables. Rank(CC) is the decile rank of customer-base concentration (CC) scaled to be bounded between 0 
and 1. Our sample includes firms from 1977 to 2007. We only include non-financial firms which have non-missing 
customer-base concentration measures, non-missing accounting profitability measures, and non-negative book value of 
equity.  Panel A reports results for the full sample which includes both profitable and unprofitable firm years, while Panel 
B reports results for the subset of firm years that have positive operating margins, and Panel C reports the results for firm 
years with negative operating margins. We average the coefficients over time and report the means in the first rows and the 
corresponding Newey-West-adjusted t-statistics in the rows below in parentheses. Following Patatoukas (2012), we 
calculate the customer-base concentration measure (CC) as the sum of the squares of the sales shares of a supplier firm’s 
major customers. The dependent variables include (1) return on assets (ROA), (2) return on equity (ROE), (3) asset 
turnover (ATO), (4) profit margin (PM), (5) gross margin (GM), and (6) the ratio of selling, general and administrative 
expenses to sales (SGA). Other control variables include the log of market value of equity (MV), the log of firm age 
(AGE), annual sales growth rate (GROWTH), the indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm reports at least two business 
segments (CONGLO), and the leverage ratio defined as book value of assets divided by book value of equity (FLEV). N is 
the number of firm-year observations used in the regression. 
 
              
Panel A: Full sample      
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  ROA ROE ATO PM GM SGA 
Intercept -0.158  -0.343  1.038  -1.104  0.274  0.987  
 
(-5.01) (-3.46) (3.57) (-7.11) (5.26) (13.13) 
Rank(CC) -0.022  -0.039  -0.131  -0.245  -0.055  0.109  
 
(-3.85) (-3.34) (-8.90) (-4.65) (-7.82) (3.84) 
MV 0.030  0.058  -0.019  0.057  0.020  -0.034  
 
(11.69) (13.69) (-2.45) (4.80) (10.31) (-4.64) 
AGE 0.016  0.028  0.070  0.098  -0.014  -0.073  
 
(3.10) (3.47) (12.32) (3.39) (-2.08) (-11.42) 
GROWTH 0.006  0.033  0.372  0.010  0.024  0.027  
 
(0.53) (1.30) (7.76) (0.56) (3.87) (2.59) 
CONGLO -0.004  -0.005  0.001  0.055  -0.054  -0.081  
 
(-1.61) (-2.24) (0.14) (5.10) (-20.61) (-9.00) 
FLEV -0.002  -0.010  0.011  0.009  -0.005  -0.013  
 
(-2.12) (-1.33) (2.01) (3.33) (-8.00) (-7.08) 
Industry 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. 
       
Avg. R2 0.197  0.166  0.323  0.131  0.201  0.195  
N 49,118 49,118 49,118 49,118 49,118 49,118 
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Panel B: Positive-OM sample      Panel C: Negative-OM sample     
               
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  ROA ROE ATO PM GM SGA     ROA ROE ATO PM GM SGA 
Intercept 0.018  -0.095  1.374  -0.007  0.385  0.330   Intercept -0.312  0.073  0.984  -1.584  0.168  0.984  
 (1.20) (-0.20) (5.72) (-1.40) (-6.56) (-10.98)   (-6.68) (0.37) (3.97) (-3.27) (2.30) (4.89) 
Rank(CC) 0.017  0.033  -0.045  0.017  -0.014  -0.047   Rank(CC) -0.062  -0.108  -0.378  -0.824  -0.139  0.454  
 (6.56) (4.80) (-2.22) (15.00) (-1.69) (-5.46)   (-4.86) (-3.52) (-2.66) (-8.13) (-6.46) (10.26) 
MV 0.014  0.030  -0.051  0.015  0.015  -0.007   MV 0.008  0.015  -0.029  -0.011  -0.002  0.008  
 (11.61) (10.68) (-5.19) (9.64) (-7.64) (-4.34)   (2.18) (2.50) (-1.42) (-0.51) (-0.29) (0.72) 
AGE -0.005  -0.006  0.041  -0.002  -0.024  -0.014   AGE 0.040  0.062  0.047  0.305  0.008  -0.169  
 (-1.42) (-0.87) (5.42) (-0.72) (-4.89) (-4.79)   (10.75) (6.32) (1.34) (7.14) (1.07) (-9.99) 
GROWTH 0.040  0.097  0.508  0.021  0.015  0.000   GROWTH -0.035  -0.059  0.166  0.041  0.038  0.049  
 (6.52) (5.17) (16.00) (6.63) (-3.26) (-0.20)   (-3.03) (-2.61) (2.64) (0.82) (2.53) (1.66) 
CONGLO -0.016  -0.028  -0.012  -0.013  -0.063  -0.036   CONGLO 0.023  0.055  0.053  0.257  -0.032  -0.240  
 (-11.53) (-13.74) (-2.23) (-10.84) (-32.46) (-27.95)   (3.19) (2.60) (0.80) (4.86) (-2.01) (-7.20) 
FLEV -0.004  0.017  0.006  -0.004  -0.006  -0.005   FLEV 0.001  -0.152  -0.006  0.038  -0.003  -0.025  
 (-8.77) (2.50) (1.31) (-12.82) (-9.30) (-9.34)   (0.47) (-15.65) (-0.29) (3.44) (-0.89) (-2.56) 
Industry 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E.  F.E. 
               Avg. R2 0.219 0.175 0.366 0.174 0.383 0.322  Avg. R
2 0.288 0.452 0.42 0.278 0.279 0.326 
N 38,542 38,542 38,542 38,542 38,542 38,542   N 10,572 10,572 10,572 10,572 10,572 10,572 
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Table 5: Impact of customer-base concentration on operating leverage and demand uncertainty  
Panel A reports panel data means of operating expenses as a percentage of sales. Panel B of Table 5 reports the mean and median elasticity values of costs of goods sold 
(COGS) and selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A) with respect to sales. Panel C of Table 5 reports the mean and median values of demand uncertainty 
for each customer-base concentration quintile. Panel D of Table 5 reports Fama MacBeth regressions of COGS elasticity, SG&A elasticity and demand uncertainty on 
Rank(CC) and other firm covariates. Each year firms are sorted into ten portfolios based on their customer-base concentration measure (CC): Rank(CC) is the 
corresponding decile rank scaled to be bounded between 0 and 1. The marginal elasticity of COGS (SG&A expense) with respect to sales of firm i in year t is calculated 
as the change in log-COGS (SG&A expense) for firm i from year t-1 to year t , ΔlnCOGSi,t (ΔlnSG&Ai,t), divided by the change in log-sales for firm i from year t-1 to 
year t (ΔlnSalesi,t). The demand uncertainty for firm i is defined as the standard deviation of annual changes in log-sales. Following Banker et al. (2012), we estimate 
demand uncertainty on a rolling basis, using the data for the most recent 5 years. H-L column reports the cross-sectional differences between the mean and median 
COGS elasticity, SG&A elasticity and demand uncertainty estimations of the highest and lowest customer-base concentration quintiles.  N is the number of firm-year 
observations. H-L cross-sectional differences that are statistically significant at the one percent level (significant at p < 0.01) are denoted with ***, those that are 
statistically significant at the five percent level (significant at p < 0.05) are denoted with **, and those that are statistically significant at the ten percent level (significant 
at p < 0.10) are denoted with *. H-L cross-sectional differences that are statistically insignificant are not marked. MB is the market-to-book ratio, and AT measures total 
assets. All other control variables are as defined in earlier tables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Customer base concentration and elasticity of operating expenses with respect to sales   
Customer-base 
Concentration 
COGS Elasticity   SG&A Elasticity   
N Mean Median   N Mean Median   
Lowest 9,867 0.97 0.98  9,867 0.79 0.83  
2 9,889 0.95 0.97  9,889 0.72 0.74  
3 9,889 0.91 0.96  9,889 0.69 0.7  
4 9,843 0.92 0.96  9,845 0.66 0.65  
Highest 9,727 0.87 0.96  9,727 0.56 0.52  
         
H - L       -0.10***     -0.02*** 
  
    -0.23***     -0.31***   
 
 
Panel A: Operating expenses 
Item % of Sales 
Cost of Goods Sold 64.4% 
SG&A Expenses 39.1% 
Advertising Expense   1.0% 
Non-advertising SG&A Expenses 38.1% 
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Panel C: Customer base concentration and demand uncertainty 
Customer-base 
Concentration 
Demand Uncertainty 
 
N Mean Median   
Lowest 7,030 0.19 0.13 
 
2 7,024 0.22 0.15 
 
3 6,722 0.24 0.17 
 
4 6,282 0.26 0.19 
 
Highest 5,838 0.32 0.22 
 
H - L        0.12***     0.09***   
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Panel D: Relationship of customer concentration to cost elasticity and demand uncertainty  
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
  COGS Elasticity   SG&A Elasticity   Demand Uncertainty 
Intercept 1.234 1.199 1.175   0.703 0.666 0.659   0.466 0.462 0.476 
  (2.58) (2.44) (2.43)   (1.61) (1.49) (1.46)   (6.42) (7.73) (7.63) 
Rank(CC) -0.058 -0.059 -0.051   -0.144 -0.149 -0.134   0.069 0.076 0.067 
  (-1.95) (-1.90) (-1.65)   (-2.48) (-2.61) (-2.40)   (5.59) (6.26) (5.95) 
MV 0.006 0.000     0.071 0.067     -0.023 -0.022   
  (2.19) (0.20)     (6.09) (5.74)     (-44.07) (-34.19)   
AT     0.008       0.072       -0.028 
      (1.62)       (9.85)       (-30.16) 
AGE -0.005 -0.006 -0.007   -0.033 -0.025 -0.033   -0.055 -0.056 -0.051 
  (-0.51) (-0.61) (-0.64)   (-1.68) (-1.27) (-1.49)   (-6.72) (-6.84) (-5.98) 
GROWTH   -0.003 -0.003     0.009 0.036     0.110 0.103 
    (-0.11) (-0.09)     (0.56) (2.58)     (14.08) (12.68) 
CONGLO   0.074 0.070     0.019 0.003     0.010 0.016 
    (3.23) (2.97)     (0.81) (0.11)     (2.04) (3.14) 
FLEV 0.006 0.002 0.002   0.013 0.012 0.006   0.003 0.005 0.007 
  (1.85) (0.86) (0.73)   (1.49) (1.31) (0.79)   (1.30) (2.42) (3.51) 
MB -0.013       -0.010       0.013     
  (-3.08)       (-2.49)       (10.38)     
Industry 
Yes Yes Yes 
  
Yes Yes Yes 
  
Yes Yes Yes 
F.E.     
Avg. R2 0.051 0.051 0.051   0.055 0.055 0.055   0.212 0.225 0.234 
N 49,139 49,112 49,112   48,675 48,652 48,652   32,854 32,843 32,843 
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Table 6: Impact of customer-base concentration on the likelihood of firm failure 
Panel A reports results from dynamic logistic regressions of the failure indicator on the predictor variables for all firms in 
CRSP-COMPUSTAT between 1980 and 2007. Panel B reports mean failure probabilities for all firms including those with 
missing customer links, while Panel C reports mean values for firm characteristics known to affect failure rates. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm fails in a given year, where failure is defined in the spirit of 
Demers and Joos (2007). The data are constructed such that all independent variables are observed 12 months before the 
failure event. Each year firms are sorted into ten portfolios based on their customer-base concentration value (CC): Rank(CC) 
is the corresponding decile rank scaled to be bounded between 0 and 1. SG&A Elasticity is the elasticity value of selling, 
general and administrative expenses (SG&A) with respect to sales. No CC is equal to 1 if the firm has no available CC value, 
Rank(CC)_1 is equal to 1 if Rank(CC) is less than or equal to 0.3, Rank(CC)_2 is equal to 1 if Rank(CC) is between 0.3 and 
0.5 and is suppressed to avoid the dummy variable trap. Rank(CC)_3 is equal to 1 if Rank(CC) is between 0.5 and 0.8, and 
Rank(CC)_4 is equal to 1 if Rank(CC) is between 0.8 and 1. TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of total 
assets. NIMTA is the ratio of net income to the market value of total assets. SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns over the previous three months. MB is the market-to-book ratio. RSIZE is the log ratio of market capitalization to the 
market value of the S&P 500 index. CASHMTA is the ratio of cash to the market value of total assets. PRICE is the log of last 
available price. EXRET is the monthly log excess stock return relative to the S&P 500 index as calculated in CHS (2008). 
Values of z-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  N is the total number of firm-year observations 
in the sample and # of Failures is the number of failure events observed in the entirety of the sample. McFadden pseudo R2 
values are reported for each regression. 
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Panel A: Dynamic failure prediction 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Failure Failure Failure 
Intercept -14.040 -14.159 -12.908 
 (-31.70) (-31.75) (-55.76) 
Rank(CC )  0.401  
  (3.21)  
No CC   0.268 
   (3.27) 
Rank(CC)_1   -0.094 
   (0.90) 
Rank(CC)_3    0.099 
   (1.01) 
Rank(CC)_4   0.250 
   (2.39) 
TLMTA 2.380 2.456 1.805 
 (13.79) (14.08) (19.66) 
NIMTA -21.716 -21.560 -22.061 
 (-13.48) (-13.38) (-24.80) 
SIGMA 0.457 0.454 0.795 
 (3.87) (3.84) (13.35) 
MB 0.291 0.286 0.168 
 (10.24) (10.05) (10.01) 
RSIZE -0.675 -0.666 -0.617 
 (-18.68) (-18.33) (-33.60) 
CASHMTA -1.251 -1.302 -1.088 
 (-3.57) (-3.71) (-5.55) 
EXRET -4.123 -4.097 -0.641 
 (-5.33) (-5.30) (-4.62) 
# of Failures 771 771 2,607 
N 48,948 48,948 142,398 
Pseudo R2 0.209 0.210 0.202 
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Panel B: Customer base concentration and failure probability 
Customer-base  Customer-base 
Concentration Rank N 
Mean 
Default 
Probability 
Std. 
Dev. Concentration   
No CC  N/A 90,867 0.018 0.037 
Rank(CC)_1  0<=Rank(CC)<=0.3 16,591 0.013 0.030 
Rank(CC)_2  0.3<Rank(CC)<=0.5 10,609 0.017 0.033 
Rank(CC)_3  0.5<Rank(CC)<=0.8 15,143 0.020 0.037 
Rank(CC)_4   0.8<Rank(CC)<=1 9,213 0.025 0.043 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel C: Customer base concentration and firm characteristics vital  for survival 
    Customer-base N Profitability Volatility Cash Holdings Leverage  Concentration Concentration Rank 
 No CC N/A 90,867 0.35% 49.44% 7.84% 47.88% 
 Rank(CC)_1 0<=Rank(CC)<=0.3 16,591 0.34% 53.49% 7.67% 40.19% 
 Rank(CC)_2 0.3<Rank(CC)<=0.5 10,609 0.15% 59.89% 9.21% 36.18% 
 Rank(CC)_3 0.5<Rank(CC)<=0.8 15,143 0.07% 63.29% 10.11% 34.03% 
 Rank(CC)_4 0.8<Rank(CC)<=1 9,213 -0.32% 67.95% 12.16% 27.88% 
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Figure 2: Physical default probability in customer concentration groups 
This figure plots the mean values of predicted annual failure rates in customer base concentration groups using the 
full sample period. No CC denotes firms without any available major customer information. Each year, firms with 
major customer information are sorted into ten portfolios based on their customer-base concentration measure (CC). 
Rank(CC) is the corresponding decile rank scaled to be bounded between 0 and 1. Rank(CC)_1 corresponds to firms 
with Rank(CC) values between 0 and 0.3. Rank(CC)_2 is composed of firms with Rank(CC) between 0.3 and 0.5, 
Rank(CC)_3 includes firms with Rank(CC) between 0.5 and 0.8, while Rank(CC)_4 group corresponds to firms with 
Rank(CC) between 0.8 and 1. The firm failure probability values are obtained using the model parameters in column 
(3) of Panel B of Table 6. 
 
 
 
Probability of default in customer concentration groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000
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0.010
0.015
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Table 7: Customer-base concentration and credit risk   
This table reports results for ordered logistic regressions of the determinants of firm credit ratings. We run annual 
regressions of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Rating (RATING) on the decile rank of customer-base concentration (Rank(CC)) 
and other control variables that are known to explain firms' default risk (See Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008)). The 
dependent variable RATING is a number that corresponds to S&P Issuer credit rating from COMPUSTAT. RATING 
increases from 2 (for AAA-rated firms) to 27 (for D-rated firms) as the credit quality decreases. We report the coefficients 
in the first rows and z-statistics in parentheses. Control variables include leverage (TLMTA), profitability (NIMTA), the 
standard deviation of the daily stock returns over the past 3 months (SIGMA), market-to-book ratio (MB), a firm's relative 
size to the S&P 500 index (RSIZE), a firm's cash holdings to its market value of assets (CASHMTA) and the average of 
monthly log excess returns (EXRET) calculated in the fashion suggested by CHS (2008). 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) 
  RATING RATING 
Rank(CC) 1.084 0.564 
  (14.57) (7.34) 
TLMTA  1.173 
   (8.32) 
NIMTA  -4.396 
   (-10.07) 
SIGMA  61.129 
   (25.81) 
MB  0.048 
   (5.92) 
RSIZE  -0.834 
   (-34.18) 
CASHMTA  3.385 
   (9.88) 
EXRET  -0.017 
   (-0.08) 
N 5,954 5,954 
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Table 8: Impact of changes in customer-base concentration on firm performance 
This table reports results for Fama–MacBeth regressions. In Panel A, we study the impact of changes in customer base 
concentration on stock returns and future firm performance. The dependent variables are contemporaneous one-year buy-and-
hold abnormal return in year t (BHARt), future one-year buy-and-hold abnormal return in year t+1 (BHARt+1), and changes in 
return on assets (ΔROAt+1) and SG&A costs (ΔSGA t+1) in year t+1. The decile rank of the annual change in customer-base 
concentration and control variables are calculated in year t. We run annual regressions of year t to year t+1 changes in ROA and 
SGA as well as BHARs calculated in year t and t+1 on the decile rank of annual change in customer-base concentration from 
year t-1 to year t and on year t values of a number of control variables. Our sample includes firms from 1977 to 2007. We only 
include non-financial firms with non-missing customer-base concentration firm-year observations, non-missing accounting 
profitability measures, and non-negative book value of equity. Rank(ΔCCt) is the decile rank of annual change in customer-base 
concentration scaled to be bounded between 0 and 1. Other control variables are profit margin (PMt), asset turnover (ATOt), 
annual change in profit margin (ΔPMt), annual change in asset turnover (ΔATOt), ratio of income before extraordinary items 
scaled by the beginning of year market value of equity (EARN), market beta (BETA) and sales growth (GROWTH). N is the 
number of firm-year observations used in the regression. In Panel B, we compare the future sales growth of suppliers that 
recently have acquired a major customer to be new supplier firms with a matched sample of firms that have no major customers. 
At the bottom of panel B, we average the coefficients over time and report the means in the first rows and the corresponding 
Newey-West-adjusted t-statistics in the rows below in parentheses. 
 
 
         
Panel A: Change in customer base concentration, stock returns, and future performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  BHARt BHARt+1 ΔROAt+1 ΔSGAt+1 
Intercept -0.219 -0.077 0.002 0.014 
 (-2.36) (-0.65) (0.22) (0.80) 
Rankt(ΔCC) 0.072 0.015 -0.007 0.017 
 (3.46) (1.38) (-2.22) (6.07) 
PMt 0.207 -0.138 -0.076 0.047 
 (1.35) (-0.97) (-1.50) (1.86) 
ATOt 0.053 0.010 -0.010 -0.002 
 (2.65) (0.50) (-12.71) (-1.04) 
ΔPMt 0.049 0.222 0.021 0.024 
 (1.06) (1.06) (0.78) (0.97) 
ΔATOt 0.290 -0.004 0.003 0.000 
 (5.70) (-0.23) (1.10) (0.08) 
Industry 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. 
Avg. R2 0.174 0.132 0.120 0.191 
N 35,488 31,716 35,668 35,419 
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Panel B: Suppliers with new major customer links compared to similar firms with no major customers 
    Sales Growth t   Sales Growth t+1 
Year N New suppliers  
Matching 
firms Difference   
New 
suppliers 
Matching 
firms Difference 
1981 79 0.238 0.148 0.089   0.064 0.029 0.033 
1982 75 0.188 0.077 0.111   0.136 0.049 0.111 
1983 88 0.436 0.219 0.231   0.244 0.172 0.080 
1984 91 0.238 0.322 -0.084   0.108 0.060 0.051 
1985 114 0.166 0.145 0.020   0.132 0.201 -0.074 
1986 114 0.345 0.170 0.175   0.323 0.194 0.205 
1987 88 0.319 0.420 -0.100   0.243 0.119 0.127 
1988 92 0.284 0.172 0.109   0.168 0.083 0.096 
1989 92 0.334 0.113 0.221   0.170 0.027 0.156 
1990 93 0.292 0.143 0.148   0.112 0.050 0.081 
1991 99 0.187 0.077 0.110   0.142 0.156 -0.012 
1992 123 0.219 0.128 0.090   0.258 0.236 0.006 
1993 136 0.321 0.094 0.227   0.280 0.274 0.032 
1994 110 0.394 0.173 0.181   0.304 0.095 0.175 
1995 120 0.400 0.199 0.201   0.193 0.204 0.013 
1996 143 0.304 0.231 0.073   0.227 0.264 0.016 
1997 127 0.483 0.198 0.285   0.263 0.153 0.119 
1998 174 0.300 0.200 0.101   0.134 0.138 0.004 
1999 144 0.326 0.210 0.117   0.300 0.244 0.041 
2000 160 0.486 0.220 0.305   0.093 0.066 0.043 
2001 141 0.165 0.100 0.063   -0.030 0.013 -0.044 
2002 177 0.045 0.091 -0.046   0.149 0.081 0.058 
2003 130 0.120 0.117 0.003   0.272 0.182 0.064 
2004 114 0.274 0.164 0.110   0.196 0.182 0.021 
2005 104 0.245 0.125 0.120   0.166 0.114 0.042 
2006 97 0.236 0.113 0.131   0.210 0.164 0.068 
2007 82 0.350 0.123 0.226   0.204 0.142 0.062 
                 
Mean  0.284 0.169 0.116  0.185 0.138 0.054 
        (6.15)       (5.03) 
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Table 9: Impact of survivorship and duration of customer links on firm performance and risk 
This table reports the results of yearly cross-sectional regressions of accounting performance measures on Rank(CC), the 
interaction terms between Rank(CC) and the quintile dummies of link age and firm age well as control variables. Rank(CC) is 
the decile rank of customer-base concentration (CC) scaled to be bounded between 0 and 1. Our sample includes firms from 
1977 to 2007. Panel A reports results for link age quintiles, where LINKAGE  measures in log years the weighted average of the 
duration of the relationships that a firm has maintained with its major customers and LA_Q2, LA_Q3, LA_Q4 and LA_Q5 are 
dummy variables that equal one if LINKAGE falls into the second, third, fourth, and fifth quintile, respectively. Panel B reports 
analogous results for AGE quintiles, where AGE equals the age of the firm as a public corporation. Panel C further tests the 
relationship life-cycle hypothesis by adding LINKAGE and the interaction of Rank(CC) and LINKAGE to the set of control 
variables, using suppliers with identifiable major customers. All dependent variables as well as control variables are described in 
detail in Tables 1 and 4. 
 
              
Panel A: Impact of customer concentration on firm performance as customer links mature 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  ROA ROE ATO PM GM SGA 
Intercept -0.186 -0.244 1.100 -0.855 0.327 0.874 
 
(-3.53) (-2.25) (6.68) (-7.32) (14.48) (10.30) 
Rank(CC) -0.060 -0.121 -0.246 -0.391 -0.066 0.229 
 
(-6.74) (-5.10) (-6.72) (-6.09) (-4.67) (5.39) 
Rank(CC) * LA_Q2 0.040 0.101 0.144 0.108 -0.015 -0.101 
 
(4.34) (4.47) (6.23) (2.16) (-1.37) (-3.20) 
Rank(CC) * LA_Q3 0.059 0.113 0.169 0.227 -0.003 -0.165 
 
(8.41) (6.52) (10.07) (4.64) (-0.31) (-3.48) 
Rank(CC) * LA_Q4 0.079 0.141 0.235 0.322 0.009 -0.227 
 
(6.47) (6.26) (8.54) (3.96) (0.53) (-4.85) 
Rank(CC) * LA_Q5 0.088 0.154 0.322 0.318 -0.014 -0.251 
 
(6.38) (5.65) (8.21) (4.04) (-0.86) (-4.90) 
MV 0.029 0.055 -0.025 0.050 0.022 -0.029 
 
(16.07) (16.58) (-3.85) (8.44) (11.00) (-8.76) 
AGE 0.011 0.021 0.044 0.069 -0.012 -0.051 
 
(2.51) (2.66) (3.98) (3.00) (-1.86) (-8.35) 
GROWTH 0.015 0.058 0.381 0.035 0.027 0.005 
 
(2.75) (5.52) (22.43) (1.65) (4.10) (0.46) 
CONGLO -0.001 -0.002 0.038 0.060 -0.055 -0.083 
 
(-0.23) (-0.29) (3.02) (7.25) (-25.58) (-13.21) 
FLEV -0.002 -0.012 0.016 0.009 -0.005 -0.012 
 
(-2.08) (-1.11) (3.86) (4.42) (-4.29) (-15.73) 
Industry 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. 
       
Avg. R2 0.220 0.198 0.374 0.168 0.249 0.231 
N 22,311 22,311 22,311 22,311 22,311 22,311 
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Panel B: Impact of customer concentration on firm performance as the firm matures 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  ROA ROE ATO PM GM SGA 
Intercept -0.176 -0.266 1.356 -0.879 0.222 0.766 
 
(-5.42) (-3.22) (3.91) (-4.99) (5.27) (10.77) 
Rank(CC) -0.073 -0.117 -0.322 -0.602 -0.064 0.325 
 
(-5.04) (-4.89) (-17.91) (-3.72) (-2.58) (6.13) 
Rank(CC) * AGE_Q2 0.033 0.044 0.124 0.320 0.047 -0.158 
 
(3.14) (2.29) (5.82) (2.47) (2.25) (-4.11) 
Rank(CC) * AGE_Q3 0.057 0.080 0.210 0.416 0.024 -0.235 
 
(9.11) (7.03) (4.61) (3.59) (1.49) (-9.35) 
Rank(CC) * AGE_Q4 0.084 0.139 0.246 0.538 0.008 -0.334 
 
(4.95) (6.53) (18.27) (3.36) (0.21) (-9.67) 
Rank(CC) * AGE_Q5 0.088 0.140 0.363 0.555 -0.027 -0.377 
 
(3.48) (3.25) (22.56) (3.46) (-0.72) (-8.98) 
MV 0.031 0.059 -0.019 0.060 0.020 -0.036 
 
(11.34) (13.40) (-2.47) (4.56) (9.73) (-4.68) 
GROWTH 0.007 0.033 0.370 0.012 0.028 0.028 
 
(0.55) (1.25) (7.46) (0.63) (4.28) (2.71) 
CONGLO -0.004 -0.004 0.005 0.058 -0.055 -0.084 
 
(-1.35) (-1.74) (0.60) (4.53) (-22.12) (-8.78) 
FLEV -0.002 -0.010 0.012 0.009 -0.005 -0.013 
 
(-1.99) (-1.32) (2.04) (2.98) (-7.98) (-6.42) 
Industry 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. 
       
Avg. R2 0.206 0.171 0.326 0.140 0.206 0.204 
N 49,118 49,118 49,118 49,118 49,118 49,118 
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Panel C: Impact of relationship duration on cost fixity and demand uncertainty      
  
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
    SG&A Elasticity   Demand Uncertainty 
Intercept  -0.864 -0.864 -0.839  0.350 0.348 0.359 
  
(-0.95) (-0.98) (-0.95)  (6.27) (7.18) (6.79) 
Rank(CC)  -0.287 -0.287 -0.283  0.181 0.180 0.166 
  
(-4.14) (-4.55) (-4.23)  (20.95) (22.14) (18.91) 
Rank(CC)* LINKAGE  0.080 0.083 0.082  -0.094 -0.090 -0.086 
  
(3.49) (3.49) (3.28)  (-6.63) (-6.30) (-6.18) 
MV  0.045 0.044   -0.019 -0.018  
  
(2.68) (2.78)   (-24.30) (-24.24)  
AT    0.038    -0.023 
    
(2.40)    (-21.84) 
AGE  -0.031 -0.019 -0.019  -0.043 -0.047 -0.042 
  
(-1.55) (-0.92) (-0.84)  (-6.26) (-7.54) (-6.09) 
GROWTH   0.049 0.066   0.091 0.086 
   
(1.60) (2.47)   (17.72) (16.96) 
CONGLO   -0.006 -0.012   0.012 0.017 
   
(-0.13) (-0.25)   (2.48) (3.19) 
FLEV  -0.008 -0.008 -0.011  0.002 0.004 0.006 
  
(-0.77) (-0.61) (-0.78)  (0.98) (1.62) (2.19) 
MB  0.000    0.011   
  
(0.06)    (7.33)   
Industry  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
F.E.   
Avg. R2  0.082 0.077 0.082  0.275 0.281 0.287 
N   22,117 22,112 22,112   15,182 15,181 15,181 
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Table 10: Impact of the duration of customer links on operating performance 
We analyze the impact of customer-base concentration on the components of firms’ operating performance. Panel A presents results for the full sample and Panel B presents 
results for the subsample with identifiable customers. The dependent variables include inventory holdings, asset turnover components as well as selling, general and 
administrative expenses and three variables that capture working capital efficiencies: (1) IHLD: the ratio of inventory to the book value of total assets, (2) INVT: inventory 
turnover, (3) RCVBLE: account receivables turnover, (4) NPP&E: net PP&E turnover, (5) INTANG: intangible asset turnover, (6) CASH: cash turnover, (7) ADVERT: 
advertising expense to sales, (8) DAYS_RCVBLE: days’ receivables measured as the ratio of accounts receivable to sales multiplied by 365, (9) DAYS_INVT: days’ inventory 
measured as the ratio of inventory to cost of goods sold multiplied by 365, and (10) DOUBTFUL: provisions for doubtful accounts; measured as the ratio of estimated doubtful 
accounts receivable to total accounts receivable. Rank(CC), is the firm’s decile rank based on its customer-base concentration score, and is bound between 0 and 1. Other control 
variables include the log of market value of equity (MV), the log of firm age (AGE), annual sales growth rate (GROWTH), the indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm reports 
at least two business segments (CONGLO), the leverage ratio defined as book value of assets divided by book value of equity (FLEV), and link age (LINKAGE), the weighted 
average of the duration of the relationships between a firm and its major customers.  
 
 
Panel A: Full Sample                   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) 
    Asset turnover components    Working capital efficiencies 
  IHLD INVT  RCVBLE NPP&E  INTANG  CASH  ADVERT  DAY_RCVBLE DAY_INVT DOUBTFUL 
Intercept 0.182 50.529 7.002 30.082 101.306 46.725 0.008  124.121 117.915 0.057 
  (5.69) (1.71) (2.61) (2.47) (1.66) (5.57) (1.67)  (7.13) (4.20) (8.41) 
Rank(CC) -0.034 2.939 0.516 4.562 18.009 -14.412 -0.003  12.387 -6.225 -0.006 
  (-7.00) (2.41) (3.17) (2.14) (1.89) (-6.95) (-1.59)  (5.15) (-2.28) (-2.63) 
MV -0.014 0.343 -0.010 -1.545 1.300 -5.783 0.000  -2.651 -3.990 -0.004 
  (-34.45) (2.39) (-0.15) (-5.56) (0.40) (-5.79) (0.82)  (-8.64) (-5.79) (-16.18) 
AGE 0.013 -2.116 -0.163 0.649 -13.319 2.720 -0.001  -4.777 -2.144 -0.002 
  (21.88) (-4.81) (-1.19) (0.66) (-1.13) (1.73) (-6.06)  (-4.51) (-2.58) (-1.45) 
GROWTH -0.001 11.515 6.884 12.618 11.168 6.721 0.002  -31.784 -25.360 0.000 
  (-1.10) (7.56) (20.96) (10.21) (1.10) (2.87) (2.41)  (-16.21) (-11.25) (-0.05) 
CONGLO -0.004 0.040 -0.441 -3.925 -43.557 -4.433 -0.004  -3.108 -11.543 -0.002 
  (-2.40) (0.06) (-3.79) (-3.63) (-1.82) (-1.99) (-21.73)  (-1.42) (-8.20) (-2.40) 
FLEV 0.001 0.001 0.038 0.110 -0.588 6.283 0.000  0.456 -0.658 0.000 
  (6.38) (0.01) (0.55) (0.82) (-0.64) (4.96) (-3.23)  (1.49) (-0.95) (3.47) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
F.E.                      
                       
Avg. R2 0.449 0.274 0.251 0.108 0.111 0.111 0.115  0.155 0.229 0.140 
N 48,773 42,031 48,818 49,072 24,770 48,763 49,118  48,974 48,771 37,933 
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Panel B: LINKAGE sample          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) 
    Asset turnover components    Working capital efficiencies 
  IHLD INVT  RCVBLE NPP&E  INTANG  CASH  ADVERT  DAY_RCVBLE DAY_INVT DOUBTFUL 
Intercept 0.117 29.476 3.837 18.096 67.911 108.254 0.009  93.644 61.902 0.052 
  (25.50) (4.48) (9.89) (4.49) (1.52) (2.96) (2.07)  (12.99) (7.91) (5.38) 
Rank(CC) -0.032 -2.021 1.356 1.598 9.019 -32.882 -0.008  20.271 6.071 0.005 
  (-7.34) (-0.76) (2.88) (1.65) (1.06) (-13.23) (-10.07)  (5.17) (1.31) (1.04) 
Rank(CC)*LINKAGE 0.008 3.011 0.215 -0.255 45.919 15.530 0.000  -11.135 -11.447 -0.009 
  (3.40) (3.09) (0.59) (-0.50) (2.17) (9.87) (0.21)  (-4.48) (-8.08) (-4.80) 
MV -0.015 0.724 0.016 -1.327 -0.020 -6.823 0.001  -2.388 -3.978 -0.004 
  (-24.27) (3.27) (0.35) (-6.25) (-0.01) (-3.72) (1.370  (-7.94) (-4.73) (-12.61) 
AGE 0.013 -3.385 -0.155 0.267 -8.587 -0.841 -0.001  -2.034 1.328 0.000 
  (10.62) (-4.08) (-1.01) (0.44) (-1.32) (-0.37) (-1.96)  (-1.67) (1.22) (0.28) 
GROWTH 0.003 7.581 6.018 10.104 23.179 8.659 0.000  -30.578 -24.520 0.000 
  (1.58) (7.43) (9.14) (8.55) (3.16) (3.78) (0.90)  (-20.55) (-9.41) (-0.14) 
CONGLO 0.001 -0.158 0.042 -2.531 -46.819 -4.005 -0.004  -5.338 -10.795 -0.002 
  (0.21) (-0.37) (0.77) (-2.05) (-1.88) (-1.43) (-24.51)  (-1.68) (-5.11) (-2.25) 
FLEV 0.001 0.067 0.072 0.055 2.408 8.219 0.000  -0.163 -0.872 0.001 
  (8.01) (1.51) (1.57) (0.66) (1.32) (5.78) (0.42)  (-1.28) (-1.27) (2.95) 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
             
Avg. R2 0.469 0.310 0.376 0.178 0.171 0.146 0.150  0.200 0.259 0.171 
N 22,160 19,201 22,178 22,303 11,011 22,166 22,311  22,247 22,160 16,972 
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